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When Judges Have Reasons Not to Give
Reasons: A Comparative Law Approach
Mathilde Cohen*
Abstract
Influential theories of law have celebrated judicial reasongiving as furthering a host of democratic values, including judges’
accountability, citizens’ participation in adjudication, and a more
accurate and transparent decision-making process. This Article
has two main purposes. First, it argues that although reasongiving is important, it is often in tension with other values of the
judicial process, such as guidance, sincerity, and efficiency.
Reason-giving must, therefore, be balanced against these
competing values. In other words, judges sometimes have reasons
not to give reasons. Second, contrary to common intuition,
common law and civil law systems deal with this tension between
reasons for and against reason-giving in increasingly similar
ways.
By combining theories of democratic legitimacy with
empirical, doctrinal, and historical evidence of judges’ concrete
reason-giving practices in the United States and Europe, the
Article argues that rather than being in opposition, these two legal
cultures are converging toward a common methodology. No longer
can it be assumed that civil law judges and common law judges
are on opposite ends of the spectrum.
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I. Introduction
We are in the “age of reasons.”1 Never before have reasons
been so praised, cherished, advocated, and promoted in public

1. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19–20 (1959) (“The virtue or demerit of a judgment
turns, therefore, entirely on the reasons that support it.”).
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discourse as well as in academic circles.2 Buzzwords and catchphrases such as “reason-giving requirement,”3 “reasoned
elaboration,”4 “public reason,”5 and “public justification,”6 have,
along with a host of others, become major themes of the legal and
political lexicon.7 Influential theories of law have celebrated
reason-giving as the new paradigm of democratic legitimacy.8
According to these theories, public institutions and the State are
legitimate to the extent that their decisions are justified by
reasons.9
The discussion in law and jurisprudence focuses on the liberaldemocratic virtues of reason-giving.10 Within a liberal-democratic
2. See id. at 19 (“A principled decision, in the sense I have in mind, is one
that rests on reasons with respect to all the issues in the case, reasons that in
their generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is
involved.”).
3. See Jeremy Waldron, Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism, 37 PHIL.
Q. 127, 128 (1987) (noting that liberal political theories require reasons to
accompany State actions).
4. See Weschsler, supra note 1, at 16 (emphasizing the role of reason in
the judiciary). In the 1950s, partly as a reaction against the activism of the
Warren Court, legal process scholars developed a theory of legal decision
making centered not on the outcomes of legal decisions but on the processes by
which courts decide. Against legal realists, they argued that courts should strive
to make principled decisions by focusing on “reasoned elaborations,” i.e.,
justifying their determinations on the basis of neutral principles of law. See
HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 427 (1958) (suggesting different starting
points for judicial reasoning, such as custom).
5. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 216–20 (1993) (reviving the
notion of “public reason” as a reciprocity requirement demanding that citizens
be able to justify their political decisions to one another using publicly available
values and standards); see also John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,
64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765, 766 (1997) (“Central to the idea of public reason is that it
neither criticizes nor attacks any comprehensive doctrine, religious or
nonreligious, except insofar as that doctrine is incompatible with the essentials
of public reason and a democratic polity.”).
6. See generally FRED D’AGOSTINO & GERALD F. GAUS, PUBLIC REASON
(1998) (arguing that the idea of public justification is the key idea in
contemporary liberal-democratic political theory).
7. See id. (emphasizing the reliance of legal and political lexicon on
reason).
8. See id. (citing contemporary liberal-democratic political theory as an
example of an influential theory of law that celebrates reason-giving).
9. See RAWLS, supra note 5, at 216–20 (arguing that “public reason”
requires justification by reason).
10. See generally D’AGOSTINO & GAUS, supra note 6 (explaining the liberal-
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regime, courts are defined by the very fact that they give reasons
to explain what the law is and how it applies in each particular
instance.11 More than other branches of government, judges are
expected to be model reason-givers.12 The purpose of judicial
reasons is to set forth an explanation for a decision on questions
presented before a court.13 These reasons may include the court’s
articulation of the factual and legal basis for its decision as well as
its interpretive and policy analysis of the law it is applying.14
Judicial reason-giving has not, however, always been
considered so clearly desirable.15 Reason-giving is a typically
modern idea.16 There have been historical moments when it was
deemed valuable not to give reasons.17 For instance, Roman
courts,18 ecclesiastical courts,19 and a number of aristocratic
democratic political theory).
11. See id. (emphasizing that reason is a key virtue of the liberaldemocratic political theory).
12. See Mathilde Cohen, Sincerity and Reason-Giving: When May Legal
Decision Makers Lie?, 59 DEPAUL L. R EV. 1091, 1097 (2010) (arguing that
judges are held to a higher sincerity standard than other branches of
government when giving reasons).
13. See id. at 1091 (“The lawfulness of state actors’ decisions frequently
depends on the reasons they give to justify their conduct, and a wide range of
statutory and constitutional law renders otherwise lawful actions unlawful if
they are not justified by reasons or are justified by the wrong reasons.”).
14. See id. at 1092 (noting that judges “are expected to disclose facts and
arguments supporting their actions in which they sincerely believe”).
15. See Richard H. Helmholz, The Ratio Decidendi in England: Evidence
from the Civilian Tradition, in 1 RATIO DECIDENDI —G UIDING PRINCIPLES OF
J UDICIAL D ECISIONS 73, 77 (W. Hamilton Bryson & Serge Dauchy eds., 2006)
(explaining that English judges were not permitted to offer their reasons to the
public).
16. See Laurens Winkel, Ratio Decidendi—Legal Reasoning in Roman Law,
in 1 RATIO DECIDENDI —GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF J UDICIAL DECISIONS , supra
note 15, at 9 (explaining that reasons did not accompany Roman judicial
decisions).
17. See id. (using Rome as an example of a place where it was considered
better not to give reasons).
18. In the Roman-law formulary system of procedure, which lasted roughly
from the end of the second century B.C. until the third century A.D., judgments
were typically unreasoned. See Ernest Metzger, Roman Judges, Case Law, and
Principles of Procedure, 22 L AW & HIST . REV . 243, 251 (2004) (pointing out that,
in Rome, “a system of case law would be all the more difficult to realize
because a judgment was oral and gave no reasons”); see also Winkel, supra note
16, at 9 (“Many decisions of the Roman jurists are not motivated, or justified.”).
19. As early as the twelfth century, the Pope—Innocent III—issued a
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courts20 in premodern, continental Europe functioned without
giving reasons for their decisions.21 Their task was to decide
cases, not to issue explanations.22 In Ancient Rome, for a time,
the College of Pontiffs had a monopoly on declaring what the law
was.23 The pontifices did not explain their pronouncements: they
pontificated.24 The justification commonly advanced for not giving
reasons in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries was that
explaining decisions would jeopardize, rather than further, the
power and legitimacy of the courts.25 Giving reasons, the
argument went, would create an appearance of uncertainty and
open the door to criticism not only on the part of the litigants but
decretal recommending that judges not give reasons justifying their decisions.
See Sicut nobis, X 2, 27, 6 (1199) (requiring judges to refrain from reasongiving); see also Helmholz, supra note 15, at 77 (arguing that English
ecclesiastical courts “were positively discouraged from giving their reasons when
formulating their sentences”).
20. For instance, French prerevolutionary courts had an established
practice of not giving reasons for their decisions. Legal historians usually
ascribe this non-reason-giving rule to the principle of secrecy of judicial
deliberations, which was formally recognized in a March 11, 1344 ordinance. See
ANDRÉ ISAMBERT, RECUEIL GÉNÉRAL DES ANCIENNES LOIS FRANÇAISES DEPUIS I’AN
1420 JUSQU’Á LA REVOLUTION DE 1789, at 498, 503 (1824) (“From the moment the
judgments have been delivered and published, no one shall say or repeat the
lords’ opinion. Because in doing so, one would break the oath they took to keep
and not reveal the court’s secrets.”). Similar prohibitions on judicial reasongiving can be found during the same period in most courts of last resort. See
Philip Godding, Jurisprudence et motivation des sentences, du Moyen Age à la
fin du XVIIIe siècle, in LA MOTIVATION DES D ÉCISIONS DE J USTICE 37, 59, 63,
n.81 (Chaïm Perelman & Pierre Foriers eds., 1978) (describing the prohibitions
on judicial reason-giving that existed from the Middle Ages to the late
eighteenth century).
21. See Winkel, supra note 16, at 9 (noting that some courts believed that
refraining from reason-giving was both functional and desirable).
22. See id. (arguing that these courts believed reason-giving would do more
harm than good).
23. See DIG. 1.2.2.6 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 18) (composing part of the Digest,
the body of civil law issued under Justinian I).
24. See ALBERT R. J ONSEN & STEPHEN T OULMIN, THE ABUSE OF
CASUISTRY : A HISTORY OF MORAL R EASONING 53 (1988) (“Unlike modern
judges, Roman pontiffs were required only to render decisions: they did not have
to give reasons or cite well-established ‘rules’ as justifying their adjudications.”).
25. See 6 PHILIPPE GODDING , LA J URISPRUDENCE , TYPOLOGIE DES
SOURCES DU M OYEN-AGE OCCIDENTAL 20 n.14 (1973) (pointing out that
thirteenth-century Italian canonist Hostiensis observed that it would be
foolhardy for judges to give reasons because if the reasons were found
erroneous, the disposition could be voidable under canon law rules).
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also on the part of other institutions, the most dreaded of which
was the royal power.26 The idea was that by refraining from
giving reasons, courts would preserve their discretion to decide
cases and make law as they pleased because their decisions
would be insulated from review and annulment.27 A few modern
institutions are reminiscent of this way of thinking about reasongiving.28 To this day, reason-giving is discouraged or even
prohibited in a number of decision-making contexts, such as those
involving juries,29 voters,30 clemency decisions,31 or nationalsecurity affairs.32
26. See generally Véronique Demars-Sion & Serge Dauchy, La non
motivation des décisions judiciaires dans l’ancien droit français: un usage
controversé, in 1 R ATIO DECIDENDI —GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF J UDICIAL
DECISION, supra note 15, at 87, 89–98 (noting that even though it is not proven
that French laws in 1789 prohibited judges from making their reasoning known,
it is true that they refrained from doing so).
27. See GODDING, supra note 25, at 20 n.14 (justifying a lack of reasongiving in Italy on the grounds that reasons might provide a basis for the
decision being voided).
28. See G UIDO CALABRESI & PHILIPP BOBBIT , TRAGIC CHOICES 57–64
(1978) (providing modern juries as an example of a current institution that does
not engage in reason-giving).
29. Traditionally, the distinctive feature of Anglo-American criminal
procedure has been that juries deliver unreasoned general verdicts. Upon
returning from their deliberations, jurors merely announce “guilty” or “not
guilty.” See id. (noting that jurors are not required to explain their decisions).
See generally John D. Jackson, Making Juries Accountable, 50 AM. J. COMP . L.
477 (2002) (describing the constitutional independence of juries from state
control).
30. Most democratic legal systems view the principle of secret ballot as an
essential institution for protecting voters from fear of intimidation or coercion.
Citizens are free not to give reasons for casting their votes; the Government is
prohibited from requiring them to justify their vote. See International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights art. 25, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
(considering the secret ballot a crucial component of a free and fair electoral
process).
31. The pardon power can be analyzed as a remnant of the old regime view
of reason-giving. For instance, the President of the United States needs not
provide any reason for granting pardons. See Daniel T. Kobil, Should Clemency
Decisions Be Subject to a Reasons Requirement?, 13 FED. SENT ’G R EP . 150, 150
(2001) (arguing against a reason-giving requirement for clemency decisions).
32. There is no affirmative requirement for the Executive to provide
reasons for its actions, although it is generally expected to do so. When it comes
to sensitive issues involving diplomacy, the secret services, or national security,
it is generally thought that some level of secrecy is desirable to conceal
information that, if disclosed, would endanger the national interest. See Stephen
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This Article has two main purposes. First, it argues that,
although reason-giving is important, it is often in tension with
other values of the judicial process, such as guidance, sincerity,
and efficiency. 33 Judges, therefore, balance the benefits of
reason-giving against these competing values. In other words,
they may have reasons not to give reasons. Second, this Article
shows that despite their very different sets of institutions and
dissimilar positive law traditions, the United States and the
Council of Europe’s judiciaries deal with this tension in
increasingly similar ways. 34 The apparent picture—according
to which civil law judges are under an affirmative reasongiving requirement and common law judges are free to balance
the justifications for and against reason-giving—should be
nuanced.35 No longer can it be assumed that civil law judges
and common law judges are on opposite ends of the spectrum. 36
This Article provides an analytical reassessment of the
reason-giving requirement and argues that the comparative
story is more complex than it appears at first. Courts, like
Holmes, In Case of Emergency: Misunderstanding Tradeoffs in the War on
Terror, 97 CALIF . L. REV. 301, 322–23 (2009) (criticizing the Bush
administration for its extensive use of the privilege not to give reasons and
analyzing a quotation from George Bush addressing Bob Woodward). George
Bush said the following to Bob Woodward: “I’m the commander—see, I don’t
need to explain—I do not need to explain why I say things. That’s the
interesting thing about being the president. Maybe somebody needs to explain
to me why they say something, but I don’t feel like I owe anybody an
explanation.” BOB W OODWARD , B USH AT W AR 145–46 (2002).
33. Infra Part III.
34. Infra Part V.
35. While the Council of Europe includes common law jurisdictions such as
the U.K., Ireland, and Malta, the majority of its member states are usually
associated in one way or another with the civil law tradition broadly defined.
See generally NINA-L OUISA AROLD, T HE L EGAL C ULTURE OF THE EUROPEAN
COURT OF H UMAN RIGHTS (2007) (questioning the adequacy of the common law–
civil law distinction in categorizing judges). Despite its well-known weaknesses,
for the purpose of this Article, I will take the common law–civil law distinction
as is. See, e.g., Mirjan Damaska, Rethinking the Common Law/Civil Law
Divide: Residual Truth of a Misleading Distinction, 49 SUP . CT . REV. (Canada)
3–21 (2010) (pointing out that the adversarial and inquisitorial models of
procedure are misleading ways of identifying distinctive features of the
“common law” as opposed to the “civil law,” but arguing that some use for the
distinction still remains).
36. See id. (calling the legitimacy of a strict common law–civil law
distinction into question).
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other public institutions, must constantly compromise between
reason-giving and other values.37 Reason-giving is only one
value of the judicial process that must be balanced against
others, such as efficiency, 38 sincerity,39 and guidance. 40
Understanding how reason-giving alternately furthers or
undermines the democratic and institutional goals for which
courts aim is as crucial for doctrine as it is for legal theory. 41
The claim is that, just as there are strong justifications for
judges to give reasons for their decisions, there are also
justifications militating against reason-giving.42 In practice,
judges may balance democratic rationales for reason-giving
against institutional, cognitive, and pragmatic reasons not to
give reasons.
This Article contends that a comparative law analysis of
courts is key to understanding these competing interests at
stake. Civil lawyers tend to think about reason-giving in
absolutist terms, while common lawyers favor a balancing
approach.43 In the civil law countries of continental Europe,
courts
are
usually
under
a
constitutional 44
or
37. Infra Part III.
38. For instance, would it be preferable for a court to give more
explanations or to move its docket faster? The answer depends on the type of
case and audience involved. While repeat players would presumably choose
speed over reason-giving, especially in well-settled areas of litigation, oneshotters probably see more value in clear and thorough explanations.
39. See Cohen, supra note 12, at 1097 (arguing that pressures towards
more judicial reason-giving may be counterproductive when they result in
encouraging boilerplate or insincere explanations). See generally Micah
Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. L. REV. 987 (2008) (defending the view
that judges should have a sincere belief in the reasons in their opinions).
40. See Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard Posner, Why (and
When) Judges Dissent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 3 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 101, 107 fig.1 (2011) (suggesting that high rates of separate opinions
by judges who reached the same decision by different reasoning may do more
harm than good).
41. See RAWLS, supra note 5, at 231–40 (emphasizing the importance of
reason-giving to the legitimacy of courts).
42. Infra Part III.
43. Infra Part V.
44. Examples of such constitutional reason-giving requirements include:
1994 CONST. art. 149 (Belg.) (“All judgments are motivated.”); Art. 111(6)
Constituzione [Cost.] (It.) (“Reasons must be stated for all judicial decisions.”);
Luxembourg Constitution art. 89 (“All judgments shall be reasoned.”); C.E.,
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statutory45 mandate to write opinions for all cases decided on
the merits.46 Yet, civil law opinions have been disparaged as
formalistic, offering little useful information for why the court
decided the way it did.47 In contrast, no such affirmative
mandate exists in the Anglo-American tradition generally and
in the U.S. federal judiciary in particular.48 Despite the lack of a
formalized requirement, however, the federal courts have
cultivated a robust tradition of reason-giving.49 They are known
B.O.E. n. 120.3, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain) (“The sentences shall always be motivated
and shall be pronounced in public audience.”); European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 6.1, Rome, 4.XI.
1950 (“Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be
excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or
national security.”). Outside of Europe, see the Peru Constitution, art. 139
(“[W]ritten motivations of judicial resolutions in all instances except merely
procedural decrees, with express mention of the applicable law and the de facto
grounds on which they are based.”).
45. Examples of such statutory reason-giving requirements include: Treaty
of Nice Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaty Establishing the
European Communities, and Certain Related Acts art. 36, Feb. 26, 2001, 2001
O.J. (C 80) 1, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:
2001:080:0001:0087:EN:PDF (subjecting the Court of Justice of the European
Union to a statutory duty to give reasons expressed in the following terms:
“Judgments shall state the reasons on which they are based. They shall contain
the names of the Judges who took part in the deliberations”). In France, there is
a general, statutory mandate for all courts—private law courts, criminal courts
and administrative courts—to write opinions accompanying their decisions. See
Nouveau Code de Procédure Civile art. 455 (allowing juries to request
consultations); Code de Procédure Pénale art. 485 & 593 (requiring the judge to
sign the formal judgment and voiding judgments with insufficient reasoning);
Code Administratif art. 9 (providing that all judicial decisions shall be
accompanied by written reasons); Conseil d’État, Aug. 2, 1924 Dame Paquin
(pointing out that the reason-giving requirement is a “general procedural rule
which must be followed by all courts even absent a written statute”).
46. Infra Part V.A.
47. See J ACK D AWSON, T HE ORACLES OF THE LAW 410–11 (1968)
(describing the cryptic nature of French judicial opinions).
48. See Arthur L. Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40
YALE L.J. 161, 162 (1930) (explaining that the balancing approach is important
in the Anglo-American tradition largely because of the role of precedent in
deciding future cases).
49. When discussing the American legal system, this Article concentrates
on the federal courts. The argument applies to most state courts, but its full
implications for the state judicial systems are too vast to trace here. There are
two additional reasons for focusing inquiry on the federal courts, at least for the
purpose of this Article. First, unlike many state judges, federal judges are
unelected. This democratic deficit means that they need to develop non-electoral
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for highly sophisticated, informative, and detailed opinions,
especially at the intermediate appellate level and at the
Supreme Court level. 50 The comparison leads to an apparent
paradox: in the U.S. system, where opinions are not always
constitutionally and statutorily required, they are abundant
and often extensively reasoned. 51 In the civil law tradition,
there is an absolute mandate for opinion writing, but many
opinions are devoid of reasoning. 52
In these two legal traditions, different branches of the
government have in principle been entrusted with the task of
balancing the competing interests at stake in judicial reasongiving. In the civil law, the people or their elected
representatives typically conduct the balancing ex ante by
imposing upon courts a blanket reason-giving requirement via
a constitutional or a statutory provision. 53 By contrast, the
American approach permits judges to weigh the justifications
for and against reason-giving themselves. 54 In civil matters,
the only rule in the U.S. Code that comes close to imposing
such a reason-giving requirement is Rule 52(a) of the
Federal Rules
of
Civil
Procedure. 55
In
bench
forms of legitimacy and accountability, such as reason-giving. Second, federal
courts, especially at the intermediate appellate level and at the Supreme Court
level, generally enjoy greater visibility from the center and often deal with high
profile cases. Judges and legal professionals across the nation follow their
dockets and read their opinions.
50. See Kevin Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE
L.J. 952, 955 (2007) (noting that, even in the face of faulty reasoning, a correct
decision cannot be overturned on appeal).
51. See id. (suggesting that lengthy opinions are low risk because correct
decisions will be upheld even if the reasoning is erroneous)
52. See DAWSON, supra note 47, at 410–11 (describing civil law decisions in
France as largely devoid of reasoning).
53. See supra notes 44–45 (providing examples of the relevant
constitutional and statutory provisions).
54. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the
Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons
for Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 387, 425–28 (describing
the origin of the reason-giving requirement in America).
55. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) (requiring the court to “find the facts specially
and state its conclusions of law separately” in actions “tried on the facts without
a jury”). Granted, the Federal Rules mandate reason-giving but only in very
limited circumstances: when district judges issue injunctions or when they rule
on summary judgment. Rule 65 thus states that “every order granting an
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trials, 56 the rule mandates that district judges find the facts
specially and state their conclusions of law.57 In criminal
matters, district judges are only under a statutory duty to
“state in open court the reasons” for imposing a “particular
sentence.”58 In short, federal appellate judges 59 and Supreme

injunction and every restraining order must: state the reasons why it issued.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(1). Rule 65 gives no indication, however, as to how those
reasons ought to be stated—orally or in writing. See id. (requiring only that the
reasons must be stated somehow). Similarly, Rule 56(a) provides that “the
court should state on the record the reasons for granting or denying the motion
for summary judgment.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The Rule 56(a) requirement,
however, has been construed as a weak reason-giving requirement as it does not
amount to a requirement for courts to make findings of fact and conclusions of
law when deciding a summary judgment motion. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986) (holding that there is no requirement that trial
judges make findings of fact when granting summary judgment).
56. By which I mean all “actions tried upon the facts without a jury or
with an advisory jury.” FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(1).
57. Similarly, circuit courts’ rules and internal operating procedures
usually direct appellate judges to write opinions for cases in which their written
explanations would have precedential value. See, e.g., 1ST CIR. R. 36.a (requiring
a judgment to be entered “when it is noted on the docket”); 2D CIR. R. 32.1.1(a)
(stating that “[r]ulings by summary order do not have a precedential effect”); 3 D
CIR. I.O.P. 7.3 (“In some instances when a panel reverses or remands a case to
the district court or agency and it is not feasible to write an opinion, usually
because the matter requires immediate attention, the court enters a dispositive
order setting forth briefly the reasons for its actions.”); 4TH CIR. I.O.P. 36.3
(allowing summary opinions that do “not discuss the facts or elaborate on the
Court’s reasoning” when “all judges on a panel” are in agreement); 5TH CIR. R.
47.6 (allowing judgments that “would have no precedential value” to be affirmed
without opinion); 6TH CIR. R. 36 (“The court may announce its decision in open
court when the decision is unanimous and each judge of the panel believes that
a written opinion would serve no jurisprudential purpose.”); 7TH CIR. R. 32.1 (“It
is the policy of the circuit to avoid issuing unnecessary opinions.”); 8TH CIR. R.
47.A.a (“The court on its own motion may summarily dispose of any appeal
without notice.”); 8TH CIR. I.O.P. IV.A (“The presiding judge on the panel assigns
each case for preparation of a signed opinion, per curiam opinion, or a
dispositive order.”); 9TH CIR. R. 36.2 (establishing the criteria for designation of
a “written, reasoned disposition” as an “OPINION”); 10TH CIR. R. 36.1
(“Disposition without opinion does not mean that the case is unimportant. It
means that the case does not require application of new points of law that would
make the decision a valuable precedent.”); 11TH CIR. I.O.P. 36.5 (“A majority of
the panel determine[s] whether an opinion should be published. Opinions that
the panel believes to have no precedential value are not published.”).
58. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2012).
59. See FED. R. APP. P. 36(a)(2) (specifically recognizing the possibility that
a judgment be “rendered without opinion”).
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Court Justices 60 have by and large been free to decide when to
give reasons, how much reason to give, and in what form—
ranging from the full-blown published opinion to the summary
order to oral explanations delivered from the bench to no reasons
at all.61
Relying on a methodology that brings together theories of
democratic legitimacy with empirical, doctrinal, and historical
evidence of judges’ concrete reason-giving practices in the United
States and Europe, this Article argues that courts operating
under supposedly opposite reason-giving regimes are actually
converging in their approach.62 More specifically, it points out
that, in a few circumscribed areas, such as sentencing and
immigration, where U.S. federal judges consider the justification
for reason-giving to be overwhelming, the federal courts seem to
move, to some extent, in the direction of the no-balancing, civil
law methodology.63 In these contexts, federal appellate judges
impose upon trial-level adjudicators an affirmative reason-giving
mandate that preempts their balancing the reasons for and
against reason-giving. Likewise, partly due to growing caseload
pressures and other resource constraints, and despite their
mandate to give reasons, civil law courts in Europe are
increasingly engaging in the type of balancing United States
federal courts are accustomed to.64 Civil law judges consider and
60. The U.S. Supreme Court is expected to explain its decisions and issue
written opinions, but it is not required to do so. See S UP . CT . R. 41 (providing
that “opinions of the Court will be released by the Clerk immediately upon
their announcement from the bench, or as the Court otherwise directs”); see also
infra notes 266–268 (describing the enormous discretion possessed by the
Supreme Court regarding how to explain its decisions).
61. See David R. Cleveland, Overturning the Last Stone: The Final Step in
Returning Precedential Status to All Opinions, 10 J. APP . PRAC. & PROCESS 61,
68–94 (2009) (recounting the past and present opinion-writing practices in
England and in the United States). For examples of contexts where no reasons
are given at all, see Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633,
634 (1995) (pointing out the U.S. Supreme Court’s practice of denying certiorari
without explanations, the federal courts of appeals’ practice of disposing “of
cases from the bench or without opinion,” trial judges’ ruling on objections or
motions without reasons, and judges dismissing jurors for cause unsupported by
justifications).
62. Infra Part V.
63. Infra Part IV.B.
64. Infra Part V.
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weigh the justifications for and against giving reasons. They
ration reason-giving in a subset of their caseload to direct their
justificatory efforts on specific cases.
The discussion proceeds in four Parts. Parts II and III
concentrate on the tension between the rationales for and against
reason-giving. Part II introduces the liberal democratic theory of
reason-giving and its focus on judges.65 Part III turns to skeptical
arguments against the unqualified value of reason-giving by
pointing out that there are also reasons against giving reasons.66
Part IV explains that although no universal reason-giving
requirement applies to U.S. federal judges, who are usually free
to balance the competing interests involved in reason-giving, they
nonetheless follow a well-entrenched practice of writing opinions
and providing oral explanations from the bench. In a few
circumscribed areas, however, such as sentencing and
immigration, where they deem the justifications for reason-giving
to be paramount, appellate judges have developed administrative
law-like reason-giving requirements that are evocative of the civil
law methodology.67
Finally, Part V develops the civil–common law comparison by
focusing on the Supreme Court of the United States and the
European Court of Human Rights as symbols of common and civil
law judicial decision making respectively.68 On the one hand, the
Supreme Court is under no affirmative duty to give reasons, but
it enjoys discretionary jurisdiction over its docket and issues
highly explanatory opinions for its decisions on the merits.69 On
the other hand, the European Court of Human Rights is under a
blanket duty to give reasons for all of its decisions.70 Due to its
65. Infra Part II.
66. Infra Part III.
67. Infra Part IV.
68. Infra Part V.
69. See Ryan C. Black & James F. Spriggs II, An Empirical Analysis of the
Length of U.S. Supreme Court Opinions, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 621, 634 (2008)
(noting the recent increase in the length of the Supreme Court’s majority
opinions).
70. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 51, Rome, 4.XI. 1950 (“Reasons shall be given for
the judgment of the Court. If the judgment does not represent in whole or in
part the unanimous opinion of the judges, any judges shall be entitled to deliver
a separate opinion.”).
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enormous caseload and mandatory jurisdiction,71 however,
European judges cannot possibly draft original and
comprehensive opinions for all of their decisions.72 Thus, they
engage in the type of balancing of justifications for and against
reason-giving that is familiar to their American counterparts.73
II. Reasons for Reason-Giving
This Part introduces the liberal-democratic theory of reasongiving.74 At the heart of contemporary theories of liberalism stand
two main ideas—pluralism, the idea that there are many
competing conceptions of the good life,75 and toleration, the idea
that reasonable persons may disagree about those conceptions
and that we must therefore learn to live with those who do not
share our values.76 The duty to give reasons arises in a democracy
as an attempt to reconcile the fact of pluralism with our ideal of
toleration.77 Proponents of very different versions of liberal
democracy usually disagree on certain features that define a
democratic regime.78 They often agree, however, that reason71. As of December 31, 2013, there were 99,900 cases pending before the
European Court of Human Rights. See EUR. CT . H.R. A NNUAL REPORT 2013, at
191 (2014) (listing the number of pending cases).
72. See id. (noting the enormous number of cases before the European
Court of Human Rights).
73. See id. (suggesting that balancing in civil courts is a function of
practical necessity).
74. See RAWLS, supra note 5, at 218 (“As reasonable and rational, and
knowing that they [citizens] affirm a diversity of reasonable religious and
philosophical doctrines, they should be ready to explain the basis of their actions
to one another in terms each could reasonably expect that others might endorse
as consistent with their freedom and equality.”).
75. See id. at 145 (explaining pluralism as a large family of views in which
each subpart “has its own account based on ideas drawn from within it, leaving
all values to be balanced against one another, either in groups or singly, in
particular kinds of cases”).
76. See id. at 154 (“To apply the principles of toleration to philosophy itself
is to leave to citizens themselves to settle the questions of religion, philosophy,
and morals in accordance with views they freely affirm.”).
77. See id. at 157–58 (explaining that reconciliation by public reason
identifies “the fundamental role of political values in expressing the terms of
fair social cooperation consistent with mutual respect between citizens regarded
as free and equal”).
78. See id. at 159 (explaining that “there is disagreement among those
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giving must be an essential activity of the democratic State.79
More specifically, they insist that judicial reason-giving is
fundamental to the political and moral legitimacy of a
democracy.80 Because under conditions of freedom, people do not
agree about values, public officials ought to justify the State’s
action on reasons that all citizens may reasonably accept, or at
least understand.81 As subpart A describes, judges, in particular,
are often presented as model decision makers because they have
a moral obligation—and in some jurisdictions a legal obligation—
to provide reasons for their decisions.82 Subpart B then provides a

holding liberal principles as to the more exact content and boundaries of these
rights and liberties, as well as on what further rights and liberties are to be
counted as basic and so merit legal if not constitutional protection”).
79. See Waldron, supra note 3, at 128 (noting that liberals demand
explanations that all can understand). Of course, there are liberal-democratic
theories that do not accord such a central place to reason-giving. On the
aggregative view of democracy, for one, legitimate political decisions proceed
from the aggregation of existing interests and preferences through voting. Such
theories consider that majoritarian or utilitarian decision schemes (elections,
conclusion of cost–benefit analysis) provide their own justification. See, e.g.,
JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 269 (1976)
(describing democracy as “an institutional arrangement for arriving at political
decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a
competitive struggle for the people’s vote”). Another example is Joseph Raz’s
perfectionist liberalism, which argues that decisions and laws have all the
authority they need if they are right or just; they need no further justification of
the sort that deliberative democrats require. See Joseph Raz, Disagreement in
Politics, 43 AM. J. JURIS. 25, 39 (1998) (refraining, however, from denying that
deliberation may be useful at arriving at better (more just) outcomes in politics).
In the last two decades, a number of philosophers have advanced a justificatory
conception of liberalism. See generally GERALD F. GAUS, JUSTIFICATORY
LIBERALISM: AN ESSAY ON EPISTEMOLOGY AND POLITICAL THEORY (1996) (critically
examining liberal political theories’ reliance on various epistemologies of
justification).
80. See, e.g., Thomas Nagel, Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy, 16
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 215, 218 (1987) (arguing not only that public justification has
the practical value of ensuring political stability, but also that the possibility of
justifying the system to as many participants as possible is of independent
moral importance); Stephen Macedo, The Politics of Justification, 18 POL.
THEORY 280, 281 (1990) (arguing that commitments to reason-giving and
reason-demanding inform some of our most valuable political practices).
81. See Nagel, supra note 80, at 218 (emphasizing the importance of
justifying State actions to as many citizens as possible).
82. Infra Part II.A.

498

72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 483 (2015)

taxonomy of the benefits theoretically achieved by judicial
reason-giving.83
A. Judges as Model Reason-Givers
A number of liberal-democratic theories depict judges as the
heroes of reason-giving.84 This depiction might come as a surprise
considering that the judiciary is not known for being the most
democratic branch of government.85 Most judges lack a
democratic pedigree in the traditional sense86—federal judges are
not elected and enjoy lifetime tenure.87 Despite their lack of
83. Infra Part II.B.
84. The two most prominent examples being Rawls’s portrait of the U.S.
Supreme Court as an “exemplar” of public reason and Dworkin’s superjudge
Hercules. See RAWLS, supra note 5, at 231 (explaining that “public reason is well
suited to be the court’s reason in exercising its role as the highest juridical
interpreter but not the final interpreter of the higher law”); see also RONALD
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 397–98 (1986) (characterizing the superjudge Hercules
as “guided by a sense of constitutional integrity,” and believing that “his
judgment about which interpretation is best is sensitive to the great complexity
of political virtues bearing on that issue”). There are a few exceptions to this
judge-centric approach to democratic legitimacy. Philip Pettit, for example,
focuses on legislators. See PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM
AND GOVERNMENT 183 (1997) (explaining that legislators have discretion over the
content of laws); see also Jeremy Waldron, The Core Case Against Judicial
Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1382 (2006) (pointing out that legislators give
reasons for their votes just as judges do: the reasons are given in what we call
legislative debates and they are published in the Congressional Record; the
difference is that lawyers are trained to study and analyze the reasons judges
give, not legislative reasoning).
85. See DWORKIN, supra note 84, at 397–98 (describing the notion of the allpowerful “superjudge”).
86. Christopher Eisgruber argues that federal judges should have a
democratic pedigree. See Christopher L. Eisgruber, Democracy and
Disagreement: A Comment on Jeremy Waldron’s Law and Disagreement, 6
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 35, 45 (2003) (arguing that the appointment
process results in a “democratic pedigree” for judges); see also Samuel Freeman,
Public Reason and Political Justifications, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2021, 2066
(2004) (discussing Rawls’s seemingly counterintuitive claim that the Supreme
Court is the “exemplar of public reason” considering the antimajoritarian
character of the Court).
87. Although federal judges are appointed with life tenure, most state
judges are elected for short terms and, therefore, presumably enjoy a greater
democratic legitimacy. See, e.g., Damon M. Cann, Beyond Accountability and
Independence: Judicial Selection and State Court Performance, 90 JUDICATURE
226, 232 (2007) (comparing the situation of state judges serving in states with
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accountability at the ballot box, a number of democratic theorists
nonetheless portray courts as “deliberative institutions.”88 They
point out that courts’ legitimacy must be established on reasons.89
Democratic theorists emphasize that even if, unlike legislatures,
courts make decisions in closed sessions, many of their processes
are open to the public.90 The U.S. Supreme Court and the circuit
courts hear oral arguments for a large portion of the cases they
decide.91 They engage in public discussion with lawyers at oral
arguments.92 Their reasoned opinions expose legal reasoning to
public view and comment.93 Concurrences and dissents reveal
disagreements among judges.94 In sum, liberal-democratic
theorists insist that federal judges’ justifications, which connect
judicial decisions to prior democratic acts embodied in the
Constitution or in statutes, function as proxies for democratic

appointment or merit selection systems and that of state judges serving in
states with elections).
88. See, e.g., John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Constitutional Courts as
Deliberative Institutions: Towards an Institutional Theory of Constitutional
Justice, in CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE, EAST AND WEST: DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY
AND CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE IN A COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 21, 22 (Wojciech Sadurski ed., 2002) (noting that constitutional
courts, despite being differently situated in various political systems, retain an
exemplary deliberative character).
89. The constraint of reason-giving is stronger for the judiciary than for
other branches of government, the argument goes, precisely because federal
judges are unelected and politically unaccountable. See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518
U.S. 343, 388 (1996) (“[J]udges occupy a unique and limited role, one that does
not allow them to substitute their views for those in the executive and
legislative branches . . . who have the constitutional authority and institutional
expertise to make these uniquely nonjudicial decisions and who are ultimately
accountable for these decisions.”).
90. See HENRY S. RICHARDSON, DEMOCRATIC AUTONOMY: PUBLIC REASONING
ABOUT THE ENDS OF POLICY 27 (2003) (emphasizing the importance of public
reasons backing all Government actions).
91. But by many accounts, oral arguments are diminishing at the appellate
level.
92. See RAWLS, supra note 5, at 231–40 (suggesting that this is because
well-reasoned justifications are expected from judges).
93. See id. (emphasizing that this legal reasoning is offered because judges
know the public expects it).
94. See AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS F. THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND
DISAGREEMENT 100 (1996) (describing well-reasoned justifications as necessary
for cooperation between disagreeing parties).
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legitimacy.95 The idea is that when courts publicly articulate
their decisions, citizens will perceive them as legitimate.96
Reasons provide citizens with a content-independent basis for
obeying the law.97 The mechanism of adjudicative legitimacy is
one of persuasion.98 Two particular liberal theories illustrate the
importance of judicial reason-giving in a democracy: Rawls’
doctrine of public reason99 and Dworkin’s conception of
constitutional democracy.100
1. Rawls’s Doctrine of Public Reason
Rawls famously argued that public reason is an essential
legitimizing feature of the liberal-democratic State.101 According
to his theory, the U.S. Supreme Court is the “exemplar” of public
reason.102 In his conception of the liberal state, the government’s
95. See id. (arguing that public reasoning is a primary facilitator of
democratic legitimacy).
96. Deliberative democrats generally agree that, for a decision to be seen as
legitimate, reasons must exist to justify the decision and be made public. See
Joshua Cohen, An Epistemic Conception of Democracy, 97 ETHICS 26, 37 (1986)
(discussing how to lend legitimacy to decisions); GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra
note 94, at 10 (“[O]nly public justifications can secure the consent of citizens,
whether it be tacit or explicit. Such justifications help sustain a sense of
legitimacy that makes political cooperation possible in the face of continuing
moral disagreement.”); RICHARDSON, supra note 90, at 27 (“The burden of
legitimation entails that governments must not act in an elementally arbitrary
way but must instead offer reasons for their actions.”). But see Earl M. Malz,
The Function of Supreme Court Opinions, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 1395, 1398 (2000)
(questioning the theory that the public cares about the process of legal decision
making).
97. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 94, at 10 (arguing that public
reasons promote legitimacy even in the face of disagreement).
98. See Christopher J. Peters, Persuasion: A Model of Majoritarianism as
Adjudication, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 14 (2001) (arguing that meaningful
participation can produce democratic legitimacy in both adjudication and
majoritarian politics).
99. See RAWLS, supra note 5, at 231–40 (describing public reason as
especially important to the legitimacy of courts).
100. See DWORKIN, supra note 84, at 410 (“Law is an interpretive concept.
Judges should decide what the law is by interpreting the practice of other judges
deciding what the law is.”).
101. See RAWLS, supra note 5, at 231–40 (arguing that public reason is
especially important for courts in a liberal democratic state).
102. See id. (describing courts as exemplary deliberative institutions in
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exercise of political power is proper only when governmental
officials offer reasons justifying their action.103 If citizens are to
enjoy equal respect, they should not be coerced on the basis of
reasons they cannot reasonably be expected to accept.104 In
essence, public reason requires citizens to explain their political
decisions to one another using publicly available values and
standards.105
Although public decisions need to be justified in various
settings,106 such as when citizens vote or representatives debate
legislative enactments,107 Rawls notes that the constraint of
public reason is most obvious in “the discourse of judges in their
decisions, and especially the judges of a supreme court.”108 He
contrasts legislators’ and citizens’ casting of votes to the Supreme
Court’s decision making.109 While legislators and citizens may
vote based on their controversial conceptions of the good, “public
reason is the sole reason the court exercises. It is the only branch
which reasons, explanations, and justifications are both expected and offered);
Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 88, at 22 (comparing “European and American
constitutional courts as deliberative forums” and arguing “that constitutional
courts are very differently situated in various political systems”); Jeremy
Waldron, Public Reason and “Justification” in the Courtroom, 1 J.L. PHIL. &
CULTURE 107, 107 (2007) (debating what Rawls meant when he claimed that the
Supreme Court is an “exemplar of public reason”).
103. See RAWLS, supra note 5, at 767 (specifying the persons to whom the
idea of public reason applies: “government officials and candidates for public
office”).
104. See id. at 770 (arguing that coercing people on the basis of the
comprehensive views that others hold may well entail coercing them on the
basis of reasons they could not reasonably be expected to accept).
105. See id. at 137 (“[O]ur exercise of political power is fully proper only
when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all
citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of
principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason.”).
106. According to Rawls, the duty to justify decisions with public reasons is
a moral, not a legal, duty: it is a duty of civility, which applies to citizens and
elected representatives as well as judges. See id. at 235 (comparing the different
ways that citizens, legislators, and judges exercise public reason).
107. See id. at 215–16 (arguing that public reason applies to citizens “in
official forums and so to legislators when they speak on the floor of parliament,
and to the executive in its public acts and pronouncements”).
108. JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 133 (2000).
109. See id. at 134 (noting that “the idea of public reason applies more
strictly to judges than to others, but that the requirements of public justification
for that reason are always the same”).
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of government that is visibly on its face the creature of that
reason and that reason alone.”110 Rawls’s respect for the Court’s
use of public reason arises in large part from its practice of
delivering fully reasoned opinions.111 The issuance of written
published opinions, including concurrences and dissents, appears
to Rawls highly congruent with the democratic function of reasongiving in a liberal society.112 In a comparable fashion, Ronald
Dworkin recognizes judges as model reason-givers.113
2. Dworkin’s Conception of Constitutional Democracy
Dworkin defends a “constitutional conception of democracy,”
akin to the deliberative conception of democracy.114 Because
people disagree about justice, they need what he calls principles
110. See RAWLS, supra note 5, at 235 (arguing that the court’s role is “to give
due and continuing effect to public reason by serving as its institutional
exemplar”).
111. In making this statement, Rawls is relying in part on Bruce
Ackerman’s work. Ackerman reconciles judicial review with democratic theory
by arguing that the Supreme Court exercises control on behalf of a majority of
“the People” achieved in the past against the laws enacted by representatives in
periods of normal politics. See generally Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional
Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453 (1989) (reconciling democracy and
representation with court decisions).
112. See Samuel Freeman, Political Liberalism and the Possibility of a Just
Democratic Constitution, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 619, 659 (1994) (covering Rawls’s
views of the courts in society).
113. See Conrado Hübner Mendes, Political Deliberation and Constitutional
Review, in LAW, LIBERTY, AND THE RULE OF LAW 121, 128 (Imer B. Flores &
Kenneth E. Himma eds., 2013) (“Rawls and Dworkin conceived the deliberative
ability of courts merely as reasongivers.”).
114. See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, 15–16 (1996) (describing his idea of a “constitutional
conception of democracy” and how it rejects majoritarian ideals). For a definition
of the deliberative conception of democracy, see Joshua Cohen, Procedure and
Substance in Deliberative Democracy, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON
REASON AND POLITICS 407, 412–13 (James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997)
(according to the deliberative conception, “to justify the exercise of free public
reasoning among equals,” in which the participants base their arguments upon
“considerations that others have reason to accept” (emphasis added)); see also
AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? 3 (2009)
(“In a democracy, leaders should therefore give reasons for their decisions, and
respond to the reasons that citizens give in return. . . . Deliberative
democracy[’s] . . . first important characteristic, then, is its reason-giving
requirement.”).
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of fairness.115 There must be fair methods for making decisions
when people differ on what those decisions should be.116 Dworkin
identifies courts as the core institutions of modern political
societies.117 While he laments the unargumentative character of
contemporary politics,118 he praises the quality of courts’ public
arguments, especially those of supreme courts.119 Dworkin argues
that the value of the public debate is increased by constitutional
adjudication:
The quality of public argument is often improved, because
the argument concentrates from the start on questions of
political morality. . . . When a constitutional issue has been
decided by the Supreme Court, and is important enough so
that it can be expected to be elaborated, expanded, contracted,
or even reversed by future decisions, a sustained national
debate begins, in newspapers and other media, in law schools
and classrooms, in public meetings and around dinner tables.
That debate better matches the conception of republican
government, in its emphasis on matters of principle, than
almost anything the legislative process on its own is likely to
produce.120

He thinks that a system of final decision by judges on certain
great issues of principle may actually enhance the participatory
character of our politics.121 Dworkin’s conception of political
legitimacy, which he labels “integrity,” is court centered.122 It
understands legitimacy on the model of judicial decision
making—the normative choices of a political community should
enjoy the same constancy and coherence that we would hope to
115. See DWORKIN, supra note 84, at 164–65 (describing fairness as a way to
ensure all people have an opportunity to share their views).
116. See id. (discussing the importance of fairness and due process in
decision making to ensure proper outcomes).
117. See id. at 2 (noting the importance of courts in shaping society).
118. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE? PRINCIPLES
FOR A NEW POLITICAL DEBATE 17 (2008) (arguing that ordinary politics is in an
appalling state as Americans no longer know how to disagree civilly while
remaining respectful).
119. See id. at 156 (praising the Constitution, as well as the courts, for
providing an opportunity for public argument).
120. DWORKIN, supra note 114, at 345.
121. See DWORKIN, supra note 84, at 7–15 (noting how our court systems can
enhance participation in politics).
122. See id. at 151–224 (discussing integrity).
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find in comparable decisions of a single person.123 The normative
claim is that society as a whole should exhibit a concern for
justice that is as coherent as any individual theory of justice
might be.124 Dworkinian judges must give reasons for their
decisions, and their reasons are constrained and inspired by prior
decisions.125
As Rawls and Dworkin’s theories illustrate, courts are often
presented as model reason-givers because of the multiple values
purportedly achieved by judicial reason-giving.126 In the next
subpart, I present these values in greater detail.127
B. Reasons for Judicial Reason-Giving
Liberal-democratic theorists have distinguished a number of
benefits theoretically achieved by judicial reason-giving.128 I
summarize these benefits by focusing on the three central values
promoted by reason-giving in the courtroom: participation,
accountability, and accuracy. At its core, imposing a reasongiving requirement aims, on the one hand, to secure litigants’
involvement in the judicial process and, on the other hand, to
keep the judiciary in check and ensure accurate decisions.
1. Participatory Reasons
Theorists of procedural justice have suggested that requiring
reasons facilitates participation.129 The key liberal-democratic
123. See id. at 193–94 (discussing the relationship between community
coherence with individual thought).
124. See id. at 196–98 (describing the importance of claims of individual
theories of justice).
125. See id. at 380 (noting some ways in which judges are constrained in
their decision making).
126. See Mendes, supra note 113, at 128 (“Rawls and Dworkin conceived the
deliberative ability of courts merely as reason-givers.”).
127. See infra II.B.2 (addressing reasons for judicial reason-giving).
128. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 12, at 1114 (discussing some benefits of
reason-giving).
129. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Participation, Responsiveness, and the
Consultative Process: An Essay for Lon Fuller, 92 HARV. L. REV. 410, 412 (1978)
(noting that the norm that an “adjudicator should explain his decision in a
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notion is that citizens have a right to be treated with equal
dignity and respect.130 On this view, judicial reason-giving is
fundamental to a democratic regime because free and equal
citizens should be treated not merely as objects of rule application
and rule making but also as autonomous agents who take part in
making the law of their own society, be it through lawsuits or
through representatives in the political process.131 Being subject
to judicial authority that is unreasoned is to be treated as a mere
object of the law or of the political power, not a subject with
independent rational capacities.132 In other words, reason-giving
treats parties and the general public as rational moral agents
who are entitled to evaluate and sometimes to participate in
judicial decisions.
Equal respect means not only that everyone is entitled to
their day in court but also that judges, at least in civil trials,
should strive to limit their role to responding to parties’
arguments.133 Lon Fuller famously defined the essence of
adjudication in terms of participation.134 He argued that “the
distinguishing characteristic of adjudication lies in the fact that it
confers on the affected party a peculiar form of participation in
the decision, that of presenting proofs and reasoned arguments
for a decision in his favor.”135 The centrality of reasoned
argument to the adjudicative process requires that decisions
made in response to those arguments must likewise “meet the

manner that provides a substantive reply to what the parties have to
say . . . help[s] to satisfy the loser that the decision is not arbitrary” and “giv[es]
assurance that the adjudicator has in fact attended” to “what the parties have to
say”).
130. See id. at 417 (“[P]reservation of individual dignity points to the
desirability of an ordering process in which those persons will be able to express
their view of the matter to the decisionmaker before the decision is made.”).
131. See id. at 431 (explaining how reason-giving is important to
democracy).
132. See id. at 426 (discussing the importance of reasoning in establishing
respectful authority).
133. See generally Lon L. Fuller, Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92
HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978) (covering the role of judges during adjudication).
134. See id. at 364 (discussing the importance of participation in
adjudication).
135. Id.; see also Eisenberg, supra note 129, at 411 (quoting Fuller’s
argument regarding the distinguishing characteristic of adjudication).
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test of reason.”136 Judges must explain their decisions to show
that they are responsive to parties’ proofs and arguments.137 By
explaining her determination, a judge indicates to what extent
arguments put forward by the parties have been understood and
accepted or formed a basis for the decision.138 Though Fuller
would not require that judges give reasons for all judicial
decisions,139 he notes that “without such opinions the parties
have to take it on faith that their participation in the decision has
been real.”140
Empirical scholarship seems to bolster Fuller’s participation
thesis.141 Social psychology studies have found the perception
that the decision maker has given “due consideration” to the
“respondent’s views and arguments” is crucial to individuals’
acceptance of both the decision and the authority of the
institution that imposes the decision.142 Direct participation in
decision making produces a more deliberative process in which
consensual agreement is more likely.143
2. Accountability Reasons
Judicial reason-giving also functions as a transparency- and
accountability-enhancing
mechanism.144
The
essence
of
136. Fuller, supra note 133, at 387–88.
137. See Eisenberg, supra note 129, at 412 (“The decision should be strongly
responsive to the parties’ proofs and arguments in the sense that it should
proceed from and be congruent with those proofs and arguments.”).
138. See id. (discussing the importance of judges explaining their decisions).
139. See Fuller, supra note 133, at 387 (“Does the integrity of adjudication
require that reasons be given for the decision rendered? I think the answer is,
not necessarily.”).
140. Id. at 388.
141. See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 69 (1988) (discussing studies addressing participation in
decision-making processes).
142. See id. at 80–81, 104–06 (showing that procedures are viewed as fairer
when they vest process control or voice in those affected by a decision).
143. See id. at 8 (“[D]ecisions are more likely to be accepted when the
procedure used to generate the decision allows participation by those affected.”).
144. Judges themselves often endorse this value. See Richard S. Arnold,
Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 219, 226 (1999)
(asking the rhetorical question, “[w]hen a governmental official, judge or not,
acts contrary to what was done on a previous day, without giving reasons, and
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accountability is answerability—having the obligation to answer
questions regarding decisions and actions.145 Because life-tenured
judges are not held accountable at the ballot box,146 their
accountability stems from the reasoned explanations they
produce.
Reason-giving ensures basic monitoring in that it implies a
one-way transmission of information from lower-court judges to
appellate judges as well as to the public generally.147 From this
viewpoint, reason-giving is about limiting judicial discretion by
ensuring that written decisions or at least some record of the
proceedings can be read and reviewed by higher courts.148 In
other words, judicial reason-giving is contingent on the
necessities of effective judicial review.149 Reasons are primarily
about facilitating control of lower courts by higher courts.150 As a
result, historically, the American legal system has viewed judicial
accountability as arising primarily from a fully reasoned written
judicial opinion, informed by comprehensive written lawyers’
briefs.151
perhaps for no reasons other than a change of mind, can the power that is being
exercised properly be called ‘judicial’?”).
145. See generally Rebecca Love Kourlis & Jordan M. Singer, A Performance
Evaluation Program for the Federal Judiciary, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 7 (2008)
(proposing evaluations to hold the judiciary accountable and answerable).
146. See Federal Judges and How They Get Appointed, FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/federal/courts.nsf/autoframe!openform&nav=menu1
&page=/federal/courts.nsf/page/183 (last visited Jan. 18, 2015) (describing life
tenure for judges) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
147. Reason-giving fosters lower and intermediate courts’ accountability
toward higher courts inasmuch as it enables reviewing courts to appraise their
decisions. Reason-giving also promotes accountability toward the general
public—including that of the U.S. Supreme Court—in a variety of ways, ranging
from public debate to legislative action. Dissatisfied citizens can elect legislators
who can overrule judicial decisions they dislike through statutes or
constitutional amendments.
148. See Cohen, supra note 12, at 1143 (“Reason-giving is an efficient tool for
supervision within the judicial hierarchy.”).
149. The giving of reasoned judgment enables any appellate court to review
the decision and decide whether it is subject to reversible error.
150. See id. (noting precedent as the primary role of reason-giving).
151. See Suzanne Ehrenberg, Embracing the Writing-Centered Legal
Process, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1159, 1163–64 (2004) (distinguishing the English
conception of judicial accountability, which depends on the ability to see and
hear a judge decide a case orally and the specifically American version of
judicial accountability, resting upon the ability to read a judicial opinion
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Reason-giving is thus a doctrine of judicial restraint.
Common law legal systems develop through precedents, that is,
judicial decisions that may or may not be binding on courts in
future cases.152 Under the doctrine of stare decisis, courts may be
bound to follow a particular precedent.153 These two principles
serve both an accountability function and a law-making
function.154 Precedent is a specific judicial accountability
mechanism, which encourages consistency, vindicates the settled
expectation of litigants and society, and promotes the rule of
law.155 The practice of reason-giving limits the scope of available
discretion over time by encouraging judges to treat similarly
situated cases alike and to treat differently situated cases
differently.156 Once offered publicly, reasons may apply to cases
that the court, in justifying a particular decision, does not have
before it.157 Stare decisis dictates that judges ought to apply rules
explaining the basis of the judge’s decision).
152. See William D. Bader & David R. Cleveland, Precedent and Justice, 49
DUQ. L. REV. 35, 36 (2011) (discussing precedence and its role in the common
law legal system).
153. See Henry P. Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39
MD. L. REV. 1, 3 (1979) (examining the thesis according to which the U.S.
Supreme Court opinions’ stare decisis effect applies to the Court itself).
154. In Federalist No. 78, Hamilton argued that in order “[t]o avoid an
arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound
down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point out their
duty in every particular case that comes before them.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 78,
at 471 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
155. See generally A. Lindquist & Frank C. Cross, Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law,
Stability, Predictability and the Rule of Law: Stare Decisis As Reciprocity Norm
(Mar. 26, 2010) (explaining the role and importance of precedent in society).
156. See Sarah M.R. Cravens, Judging Discretion: Contexts for
Understanding the Role of Judgment, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 947, 949–54 (2010)
(discussing discretion and its connection to reason-giving).
157. It is worth noting that this application was not always the case. It used
to be that common law judges were bound not by the reasons they gave in prior
cases, but only by the outcome they had reached. See, e.g., Arthur L. Goodhart,
Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161, 162 (1930) (“The
reason which the judge gives for his decision is never the binding part of
precedent.”). Today, it is generally recognized that judicial opinions, especially
those of the Supreme Court, and to a lesser extent, those of appellate courts,
serve as a means of establishing the law. See KARL L. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON
LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 26 (1960) (explaining the ways in which
court opinions and their reasoning establish the law); Schauer, supra note 61, at
640 (discussing the differences between specificity and generality and its
implication for precedent); James Boyd White, What’s an Opinion For?, 62 U.
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and principles to the case before it that have been laid down in
prior cases.158 When justifying their holdings, judges usually
declare whether the substantive holding is consistent with
existing precedent or whether they are breaking with
precedent.159 Frederick Schauer thus points out that reasongiving creates prima facie commitments to deciding future cases
similarly.160 These are prima facie commitments only because in
certain cases judges may depart from precedents and create new
law.161 Judicial reasons play a dual role: they work both as a
vehicle for precedent creation and as an enforcement mechanism
for the duty to follow precedent.162
CHI. L. REV. 1363, 1366 (1995) (arguing that reason giving is necessary for
future courts to invoke past decisions as authoritative). For an analysis of
competing understandings of judicial opinions, see generally Thomas W. Merrill,
Judicial Opinions As Binding Law and As Explanations for Judgments, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 43 (1993) (covering the role of the Executive Branch in
interpreting judicial decisions).
158. See Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous
Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1, 8 (2001) (arguing that stare decisis was developed
as a means of restraining the discretion “that legal indeterminacy would
otherwise give judges”).
159. See Glenn A. Phelps & John B. Gates, The Myth of Jurisprudence:
Interpretive Theory Interpretive Theory in the Constitutional Opinions of Justices
Rehnquist and Brennan, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 567, 590 (1991) (discussing
some ways courts use precedents). See generally Jack Knight & Lee Epstein,
The Norm of Stare Decisis, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1018 (1996) (showing that the
Supreme Court arguments from precedent vastly outnumber all other kinds of
arguments in attorneys’ written briefs, the Court’s written opinions, and the
Justices’ arguments in conference discussions).
160. See Schauer, supra note 61, at 649 (“[G]iving a reason creates a prima
facie commitment on the part of the reason giver to decide subsequent cases in
accordance with that reason.”).
161. See id. at 645 (discussing some ways in which courts can depart from
precedent).
162. English legal historian Paul Brand assumes that the doctrine of
precedent predated the reason-giving practice and suggests that the former
rapidly called for the latter as both judges and attorneys could not merely rely
on their memories of previous decisions and arguments and hence started citing
specific cases as precedents in their judgments or pleadings. See generally Paul
Brand, Reasoned Judgments in the English Medieval Common Law 1270 to
1307, in RATIO DECIDENDI: GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS, supra
note 15, at 55 (discussing the role of precedent in English courts). In contrast,
Judge Emlin McClain argues for the reverse causation. In his view, the doctrine
of precedent was the “inevitable result” of judges’ practice to announce the
reasons for their judgment. See Hon. Emlin McClain, The Evolution of the
Judicial Opinion, 36 AM. L. REV. 801, 811 (1902) (discussing the outcome of
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There are also epistemic justifications for judicial reasongiving. One aspect of judicial accountability refers to the
transparency needed both for the general public to know the law
and for reviewing courts to verify that judges are carrying out
their obligations adequately.163 Transparency in adjudication may
be thought of as an individual right,164 not just as a feature of the
judicial hierarchy and the need for lower courts to create a record
for higher courts to review.165 From this perspective, judicial
reasons are not only addressed to the litigants and the reviewing
court, but potentially aimed at the entire citizenry.166
One can identify at least three types of audiences for judges’
explanations, ranging from the most internal to the most
external:
1. For judges’ internal audience, that is, for the parties
and their counsel, transparent reasons make it much
easier to narrow the issues they will need to address if
they decide to appeal the decision.
2. For judges’ institutional audience, that is, colleagues
at the court or at other courts, members of the local
bar or other legal professionals, as well as other
branches of government, reasons are needed for
guidance and coordination purposes. If legal actors
are unaware that a particular judge or court has
handed down a specific decision, or if they cannot
identify its underlying reasons, they can hardly be
guided by it or take it into account in solving
coordination problems.
precedents).
163. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Reasoned Administration: The European
Union, the United States, and the Project of Democratic Governance, 76 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 99, 103 (2007) (using transparency as a way to provide
accountability for decision makers).
164. See id. at 105 (arguing, in the context of administrative law, that
reason-giving should be reframed as an independent human right).
165. See id. (providing other functions for reason-giving in addition to the
need for creating a record).
166. On these various audiences and their influence on judges’ decisions, see
generally LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON
JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (2006) (analyzing the potential and actual impact of several
audiences, including the public, other branches of government, court colleagues,
the legal profession, and judges’ social peers).

WHEN JUDGES HAVE REASONS

511

3. For judges’ external audience, that is, for the general
public, transparent reason-giving is crucial both for
guidance and contestation purposes. Rules that
citizens know little about or do not understand are
unlikely to provide them with meaningful guidance.
Similarly, they may not be in a position to contest a
judicial decision effectively if they cannot discern its
underlying justification.
In sum, the existence and availability of judicial reasons ensures
that a wide variety of audiences can evaluate, discuss, follow, or
criticize judicial decisions.167
3. Accuracy Reasons
Finally, reason-giving imposes a form of self-discipline that is
thought to improve the quality of the decisions themselves.168
This process is often described as the “it won’t write”
phenomenon.169 In attempting to reason her decision, a judge
167. See generally id. (commenting on the effects of reason-giving on judicial
audiences).
168. See Rt Hon. Lord Justice Bingham, Reasons and Reasons for Reasons:
Differences Between a Court Judgment and an Arbitration Award, 4 ARB. INT’L
141, 143 (1988) (“I cannot, I hope, be the only person who has sat down to write
a judgment, having formed the view that A must win, only to find in the course
of composition that there are no sustainable grounds for that conclusion and
that on any rational analysis B must succeed.”); see also Matthew C.
Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard Look” Judicial Review, 58
ADMIN. L. REV. 753, 761 (2006) (“Defenders of hard look review, including the
courts that employ it, argue that it ensures the supposedly expert agency really
has based its decision on a reasoned analysis of relevant information.”); Chad M.
Oldfather, Writing, Cognition, and the Nature of the Judicial Function, 96 GEO.
L.J. 1283, 1287 (2008) (discussing the purported benefits of written judicial
opinions).
169. For a description of this phenomenon, see Kathleen Waits, Values,
Intuitions, and Opinion Writing: The Judicial Process and State Court
Jurisdiction, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 917, 931 (1983) (“[J]udges may frequently
discover that the original opinion they originally had in mind ‘won’t
write’ . . . . The discipline of a written opinion, when combined with the goal of
neutral principles and the doctrine of stare decisis, also operates as an
important control on judicial arbitrariness.”); Richard A. Posner, Judges’
Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?), 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1421, 1447–48 (1995)
Reasoning that seemed sound “in the head” may seem half-baked
when written down, especially since the written form of an argument
encourages some degree of critical detachment in the writer, who in
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discovers that she cannot find an appropriate legal justification,
leading her to reconsider her initial ruling and make a more
accurate determination.170 The theory can be generalized to nonwritten forms of justification: forcing judges to substantiate their
decisions based on facts and legal arguments enhances the
accuracy of judicial decision making.171 It ensures that judicial
decisions are not made arbitrarily or based on speculation,
suspicion, or irrelevant information.172 The giving of reasons, it is
thought, ensures that the deciding court has considered all
relevant factors, researched the applicable law and given the case
the thought it deserved.173 The process of searching for
justifications itself performs both creative and critical functions
that result in a better decision, one that is not only more
thorough, but is more responsive to the facts and more attentive
to precedent.174 It also increases the likelihood that judges will
arrive at true findings of fact and draw correct conclusions of
reading what he has written will be wondering how an audience
would react. Many writers have the experience of not knowing except
in a general sense what they are going to write until they start
writing. A link is somehow forged between the unconscious and the
pen. The link is lost to the judge who does not write.
Alvin B. Rubin, Book Review, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 220, 227 (1981) (reviewing
FRANK M. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE: REFLECTIONS FROM THE FEDERAL
APPELLATE BENCH (1980)) (noting that occasionally judges “find that ‘it won't
write’—our jargon for saying that we cannot prepare an opinion reaching the
desired result in acceptable professional form”); Charles M. Merrill, Query:
Could Judges Deliver More Justice If They Wrote More Opinions?, 64
JUDICATURE 435, 435 (1980) (“The very act of writing opinions reinforces the
decisional process. Misconceptions or oversights may come to light in the course
of articulation.”).
170. See Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of
Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1375 (1995) (“It is not so
unusual to modulate, transfer, or even switch an originally intended rationale or
result in midstream because ‘it just won’t write.’”).
171. See generally, e.g., Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How
Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007) (analyzing the relationship
between accuracy and process of judicial decision making).
172. See, e.g., id. at 31 (providing an example of inaccurate judicial decision
making when swayed by an irrelevant settlement demand).
173. See, e.g., id. at 41 (emphasizing the importance of a court considering
all relevant factors).
174. See, e.g., Peter Friedman, What Is a Judicial Author?, 62 MERCER L.
REV. 519, 532 (2011) (establishing a connection between judicial opinions and
creativity).

WHEN JUDGES HAVE REASONS

513

law.175 Indeed, there is some evidence, drawn from cognitive
psychology research, that requiring decision makers to explain
may diminish some forms of cognitive bias.176
This Part has shown that according to a number of
democratic theories, judicial reason-giving provides us with a
model of what decision making and public justification at all
levels of government should aspire to in a democratic society. 177
However, as I point out in the next Part, the practice of giving
reasons can sometimes compromise other important values of the
judicial process. In other words, judges may also have reasons for
not giving reasons.

175. See, e.g., Timothy P. O’Neill, Law and “The Argumentative Theory”, 90
OR. L. REV. 837, 840 (2012) (discussing how reasoning can lead to a correct
conclusion).
176. See Chris Guthrie et al., supra note 171, at 36–38 (arguing that
preparing a written opinion or simply stating the reasons for the decision before
the ruling is announced may induce deliberation and reduce cognitive biases);
Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be
Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J.
67, 134–35 (2002) (noting how requiring explanation may reduce certain
framing effects in choice); see also infra Part III.B. However, there is growing
psychological literature questioning whether thinking about one’s justifications
before deciding really improves decision quality, especially in an institutional
context. See generally Philip E. Tetlock, Social Functionalist Frameworks for
Judgment and Choice: Intuitive Politicians, Theologians, and Prosecutors, 109
PSYCHOL. REV. 451 (2002) (showing that if decision makers expect to be
accountable to an audience of unknown views, they engage in “preemptive selfcriticism.” In other words, they engage in systematic reasoning about evidence;
but if audience views are known, the decision maker is more likely to move in
the direction of the audience’s viewpoint); Robert J. MacCoun, Psychological
Constraints on Transparency in Legal and Government Decision Making, 12
SWISS POL. SCI. REV. 112 (2006) (arguing that the complexity of the brain
machinery makes it difficult for actors to either consciously monitor or control
their judgment process and showing that accountability can have perverse
effects).
177. See, e.g., John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason, in DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY 93, 108–14 (James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997)
(characterizing the Supreme Court as the “exemplar” of the type of “public
reason” that should govern the public arena); see also Oldfather, supra note 168,
at 1285 (recognizing “longstanding conceptions of the judicial role, in which
reasoned analysis stands as the core feature of legitimate judging”); Louis
Michael Seidman, Ambivalence and Accountability, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1571,
1574 (1988) (recognizing that appellate judges are usually accountable in the
sense that they give reasons or justifications for their decisions).
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III. Reasons for Not Giving Reasons

Reason-giving is only one value of the judicial process, which
may conflict with other values. There may be institutional,
cognitive, and efficiency harms in systematically requiring judges
to give reasons—and certain kinds of reasons. In judicial practice,
as Part IV suggests, efficiency reasons are likely to be most
salient, but institutional and cognitive reasons, though more
subtle, may also motivate judges to carefully weigh the pros and
cons of giving reasons.
A. Institutional Reasons
An institutional justification militating against giving
reasons is that rather than furthering litigants and the public’s
acceptance of judicial decisions, it may lead to the opposite result,
that is, to inflaming people’s disagreement with judicial
dispositions and to cultivating their distrust for the judicial
institution as a whole.178 There is a tension, therefore, between
the fact that, on the one hand, giving reasons is supposed to
foster participation, accountability and accuracy, and the fact
that, on the other hand, different individuals are more likely to
agree on outcomes than on the reasons justifying those
outcomes.179 From this perspective, inquiring into the reasons
why judges come to a given judicial outcome may undermine,
rather than further, the perception that courts make accurate
decisions in a participatory and accountable fashion.
Cass Sunstein has popularized a version of this problem
under the characterization of “incompletely theorized
agreements.”180 The idea is that it is rare for an individual to
theorize any decision completely, that is, to accept both a highly
abstract theory and a series of steps that relate the theory to a
178. See Bob Dickerson, “Let’s Impeach that Damn Judge!”, 6-MAY NEV.
LAW. 6 (1998) (discussing some ways in which opinions may be misinterpreted
and lead to disagreement).
179. See id. at 7 (describing this tension and the role of the judiciary in the
middle of it).
180. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108
HARV. L REV. 1733 (1995) (discussing the idea of “incompletely theorized
agreements” and its implications).
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particular conclusion.181 For instance, people may agree that
whenever presented with case raising environmental issues,
courts should rule in favor of measures designed to protect
endangered species, “while having quite diverse theories of why
this is so. Some may stress obligations to species or nature as
such; others may point to the role of endangered species in
producing ecological stability; still others may point to the
possibility that obscure species will provide medicines for human
beings.”182 Mandating judges to give reasons, the argument goes,
creates more opportunities for contestation and disagreement by
surfacing these deep divisions within society.183 In short, giving
reasons may increase the number of issues about which it is
possible to disagree.
Moreover, when multiple decision makers are involved, they
often disagree among themselves on the appropriate reasons
justifying the decision.184 The problem is especially acute in
multimember judicial panels.185 In these contexts, while there
may be transparency reasons to encourage each individual judge
to give her reasons for the decision, there are also institutional
reasons for restricting reason-giving. Setting limits on reasongiving may bolster a court’s legitimacy (by creating a clearer
governing legal standard) and may enhance judicial efficiency (by
avoiding the considerable work associated with consistently
writing extensive majority opinions or separate opinions).186 This
restraint can be accomplished, for example, through a norm of
consensus requiring an entire multi-member panel to agree on a
common set of reasons to put forward for the decision.
181. See id. at 1739 (summarizing the theory of “incompletely theorized
agreements”).
182. Id. at 1736.
183. See generally, e.g., Martha I. Morgan, The Constitutional Right to Know
Why, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297 (1982) (discussing some of the ways
requiring judges to give reasons lead to societal discussions).
184. See Ahmed E. Taha, How Panels Affect Judges: Evidence from United
States District Courts, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 1235, 1252–53 (2005) (showing how
when judges sit in panels, their decisions are affected by other members of the
panel).
185. See id. at 1258 (discussing impacts of multi-member panels).
186. See generally J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Role of Reason in the Rule of
Law, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 779 (1989) (discussing the value of putting restraints on
judicial reason-giving).
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The history of the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion-delivery
practices illustrates these competing rationales for and against
imposing limits on reason-giving.187 The Marshall Court is
famous for introducing a norm of unanimous reason-giving doing
away with the English practice of seriatim opinions.188 In Chief
Justice Marshall’s view, Supreme Court opinions were to be
delivered by one Justice speaking “for the Court.”189 The
conventional explanation for this norm of consensus points to
institutional reasons.190 Marshall was wary of the adverse
consequences of letting Justices publicly voice their disagreement
on the Court’s legitimacy and power relative to the other
branches of government.191 In contrast, the Stone Court is often
described as having established a more individualistic reasongiving practice at the Court, leading to the demise of the norm of
consensus.192 The resulting increase in the frequency of separate
187. See generally Kevin M. Stack, The Practice of Dissent in the Supreme
Court, 105 YALE L.J. 2235 (1006) (covering the role of reason-giving, particularly
in dissenting opinions, in the Supreme Court).
188. See PERCIVAL E. JACKSON, DISSENT IN THE SUPREME COURT 22 (1969)
The course of every tribunal must necessarily be, that the opinion
which is to be delivered as the opinion of the court, is previously
submitted to the consideration of all the judges; and, if any part of
the reasoning be disapproved, it must be so modified as to receive
the approbation of all, before it can be delivered as the opinion of
all.
(citing 4 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 320 (1919)).
189. See John P. Kelsh, The Opinion Delivery Practices of the United States
Supreme Court, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 137, 144 (1999) (“During [John Marshall’s]
tenure, three important developments took place. First, nearly all opinions came
to be delivered by one Justice speaking for the Court.”).
190. See, e.g., id. at 150–52 (discussing some of the rationales for Marshall’s
method).
191. See R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE
SUPREME COURT 358 (2001) (noting the importance of solidarity among the
Justices in establishing the Court’s power).
192. See Thomas G. Walker, Lee Epstein & William J. Dixon, On the
Mysterious Demise of Consensual Norms in the United States Supreme Court, 50
J. POL. 361, 364 (1988) (arguing that the regime change occurred under Stone’s
leadership). But see Stacia L. Haynie, Leadership and Consensus on the U.S.
Supreme Court, 54 J. POL. 1158, 1162 (1992) (arguing that not Stone but
Hughes initiated the increase in separate opinions). Yet another explanation
points to the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1925, popularly known as the
Judges’ Bill, which gave the Justices increased control over their docket. The
argument is that such enhanced control over the Court’s agenda enabled the
Justices to focus on contentious issues and to being less compelled to suppress
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opinions is a central event in the history of the Court’s reasongiving practices.193 Before the shift, unanimous reason-giving was
the norm; since then, fragmentation is expected.194 Transparency
reasons have overcome institutional reasons: judicial
individualism and overt dissensus are now an accepted, perhaps
even encouraged, mode of reason-giving.195 A number of legal
scholars, however, have condemned the consequent rise in “the
number of decisions in which there is no simple majority
opinion.”196 The concern with fragmented judicial reason-giving is
that it provides little guidance to the general public and to the
courts below that have to deal with the issue.197
In sum, more judicial reason-giving in the form of separate
opinions may not only have divisive effects on the public, it may
also aggravate divisions within a court itself and, therefore,
compromise the guidance function of judicial reasons. As the
psychological literature on reason-based choice, which I discuss
below, suggests, there may also be concerns that more reasongiving would lower the quality of the decisions themselves.198

their individual reasoning. See Stephen Halpern & Kenneth Vines, Institutional
Disunity, The Judges’ Bill and the Role of the Supreme Court, 30 W. POL. Q.
471, 474 (1977) (discussing the effects of the Judiciary Act of 1925).
193. See Walker, Epstein & Dixon, supra note 192, at 387 (noting the
importance of separate opinions as a rise in reason-giving practices).
194. See id. at 386 (“Contemporary justices accept individual expression as
an established practice.”).
195. See id. at 362 (explaining the high value placed on individual reasongiving and opinions).
196. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Abandoning the Guidance Function: Morse
v. Frederick, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 205, 207 (noting ways in which courts are
dismissing their role of providing guidance through opinions).
197. This phenomenon can also be observed at the federal courts of appeals,
but to a much lesser degree. See Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard
Posner, Why (and When) Judges Dissent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis,
3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 101, 106, fig. 1 (2011) (finding a much higher rate of
separate opinions in the Supreme Court than in the federal courts of appeals: in
their samples, they found a dissent rate of 62% and a concurrence rate of 40.3%
in the Supreme Court and only 2.6% and 0.6% respectively in the courts of
appeals).
198. See generally, e.g., John McMackin & Paul Slovic, When Does Explicit
Justification Impair Decision Making?, 14 APPL. COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 527 (2000)
(questioning whether reason-giving actually leads to better decisions).
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B. Cognitive Reasons

As the preceding discussion suggests, the reasons that enter
into the making of decisions are likely to be intricate and
diverse.199 A number of cognitive and experimental psychologists
have questioned whether thinking about one’s justifications for
decisions before deciding really improves the decision quality.200
According to the traditional, rationalist theory of knowledge,
which has long prevailed in philosophy, psychology, and law,
decision making follows a linear pattern: the reasoner searches
for relevant evidence, weighs evidence, coordinates evidence with
the applicable law and the dominant doctrines before reaching a
decision.201 This is a step-by-step, conscious, intentional and
controllable process.202 Once the decision has been made, the
decision maker asked to give a justification simply recounts these
steps.
A number of psychologists, however, have offered accounts
suggesting that people’s reasoning and justifications are often
unconsciously motivated in the sense that the reasoning process
constructs post hoc justifications—even if individuals experience
the illusion of objective reasoning.203 Reasoning is “motivated” in
199. See infra Parts IV & V (discussing the numerous reasons for and
against providing reasons in decisions).
200. See McMackin & Slovic, supra note 198, at 535–39 (presenting results
suggesting that thinking about reasons for decisions before deciding may
degrade decision quality when the decision process relies on intuitive rather
than analytic tasks).
201. See generally Deanna Kuhn, Children and Adults As Intuitive
Scientists, 96 PSYCHOL. REV. 674 (2001) (1989) (discussing ways in which people
make decisions); RICHARD E. NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE:
STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980) (same).
202. See NISBETT & ROSS, supra note 201, at 530 (explaining how the best
decisions are made through conscious deliberation).
203. See generally Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational
Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814
(2001) (arguing in favor of a “social intuitionist model” of moral judgment, that
is, the claim that moral judgment is caused by quick moral intuitions and is
followed, when needed, by slow, ex post facto moral reasoning); Keith J. Holyoak
& Dan Simon, Bidirectional Reasoning in Decision Making by Constraint
Satisfaction, 128 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 3 (1999) (arguing that inferences
are inherently bidirectional, so that the distinction between premises and
conclusions is blurred, the latter often influencing the former); Marc Hauser,
Fiery Cushman, Liane Young, R Kang-Xing Jin & John Mikhail, A Dissociation
Between Moral Judgments and Justifications, 22 MIND & LANGUAGE 1 (2007)
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the sense that people show a strong tendency to search for facts,
justifications, and other “evidence” exclusively on their preferred
side of an issue.204 When individuals are asked to explain why
they decided or acted the way they did, they frequently cite
factors that could not have mattered and fail to recognize factors
that did matter.205 According to social psychologist Jonathan
Haidt, “what people are searching for is not a memory of the
actual cognitive processes that caused their behaviors, because
these processes are not accessible to consciousness. Rather,
people are searching for plausible theories about why they might
have done what they did.”206 They first turn to a “pool of
culturally supplied explanations for behavior.”207
This phenomenon has been described by Dan Kahan as the
“motivated cognition” problem, which he argues causes a
“neutrality crisis” at the U.S. Supreme Court.208 In Kahan’s view,
promoting justification in Court opinions and public discourse
generally leads to a “cognitive form of illiberalism,”209 which
reinforces the predisposition of diverse groups to attribute
culturally partisan aims to those who disagree with them.210 For
instance, when Justices invoke supposedly neutral and objective
(challenging the view that moral judgments are solely the product of conscious
reasoning on the basis of explicitly understood moral principles and providing
illustrations of dissociation between judgment and justification).
204. See Eldar Shafir, Itamar Simonson & Amos Tversky, Reason-Based
Choice, 49 COGNITION 11, 33 (1993) (“We often search for a convincing rationale
for the decisions that we make, whether for inter-personal purposes, so that we
can explain to others the reasons for our decision, or for intra-personal motives,
so that we may feel confident of having made the ‘right’ choice.”). See generally
Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480 (1990)
(discussing the connection between motivation and reasoning).
205. See Haidt, supra 203, at 822 (describing how people explain their
decision-making processes).
206. Id.
207. Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy D. Wilson, Telling More Than We Can
Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes, 84 PSYCHOL. REV. 231, 249 (1997).
208. Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court 2010 Term: Foreword: Neutral
Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125
HARV. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2011) (discussing theories of the effect of cognition on the
Supreme Court).
209. Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115,
144 (2007).
210. See id. (addressing some of the effects of Court opinions on diverse
groups).
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empirical evidence as a reason justifying the Court’s decision, the
sincerity of the justification is questioned, not only by other
Justices but also by the general public.211 According to Kahan,
Brown v. Plata,212 in which the Court affirmed a California
district court order directing the State of California to release
more than 40,000 inmates from its prisons, illustrates the risk of
cognitive illiberalism resulting from judicial reason-giving.213 The
supposedly objective and factual question underlying this
decision was that of assessing the consequences of the prisoners’
release on public safety.214 According to the majority, the district
court had “rel[ied] on relevant and informed expert testimony” by
criminologists and prison officials, who based their opinion on
“empirical evidence and extensive experience in the field of prison
administration.”215 But dissenting Justices, Justice Scalia in
particular, emphasized the “motivated” nature of the district
court’s findings, which relied, according to him, on “broad
empirical predictions necessarily based in large part upon policy
views.”216 The general public also seems to have been
unpersuaded by the majority’s reasoning: according to a poll
following the decision, 63% of respondents declared that “the
court cannot order criminals to be released.”217
The psychology of motivated reasoning suggests that
requiring judges to give reasons can be counterproductive in at
least two ways.218 First, it may encourage judges to think about
211. See Kahan, supra note 208, at 34–35 (discussing effects of utilizing
empirical evidence to justify opinions).
212. 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
213. See Kahan, supra note 208, at 32 (explaining risks in the Court’s
reasoning for this particular case).
214. See id. (highlighting the Court’s focus on public safety).
215. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1942.
216. Id. at 1954 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
217. Press Release, Fairleigh Dickinson University’s PublicMind, U.S.
Voters Weigh in on Brown v. Plata, Case Involving Prison Overcrowding (May
23, 2011), available at http://publicmind.fdu.edu/2011/brownvplata (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
218. See McMackin & Slovic, supra note 200, at 529 (2000) (“Support for the
hypothesis that thinking about reasons may disrupt the decision process is
found in both social psychology and cognitive research. The process seems to be
one in which thinking about reasons brings to mind a biased subset of cognitions
about the attitude object whereupon attitudes are adjusted.”).

WHEN JUDGES HAVE REASONS

521

their reasons for the decision in a strategic way before deciding
the outcome.219 They may, for instance, engage in preemptive
cognitive dissonance reduction220 by searching for reasons
justifying a decision that they fear will be perceived as furthering
their preferred policy objectives221 or effectuating their goals in
the long term.222 Second, requiring judges to give reasons may
work as an incentive for them to fabricate post hoc constructions
intended to justify their intuitions.223 Psychologists have
documented the fact that individuals are sometimes unaware of
the precise factors that determine their choices and generate
spurious explanations when asked to account for their
decisions.224 In short, the actual reasons that guide decisions may
219. See Philip E. Tetlock, Accountability: The Neglected Social Context of
Judgment and Choice, 7 RES. ORG. BEHAVIOR 297, 310 (1985) (discussing how
individuals may adjust their reasoning based on to whom they are accountable);
Philip E. Tetlock & R. Boettger, Accountability Amplifies the Status Quo When
Change Creates Victims, 7 J. BEHAVIORAL DECISION MAKING 1, 18–21 (1994)
(suggesting that people who are accountable to others for their decisions are in
general more likely to think about the reasons for their decisions than people
who are not accountable to others).
220. See generally LEON FESTINGER , A T HEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE
(1957) (discussing cognitive dissonance and mitigation tactics); Joel Cooper &
Russell H. Fazio, A New Look at Dissonance Theory, 17 ADVANCES
EXPERIMENTAL S OC. PSYCHOL . 229 (1984) (according to cognitive dissonance
theory, when people behave or hold beliefs which seem to contradict the
prevailing norms (e.g., irrationally, incompetently, foolishly, immorally), they
will tend to adjust their attitudes so as to make the behavior or the belief seem
less abnormal or “dissonant”).
221. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 86–110 (2002) (presenting an attitudinal
model of judicial decision making holding that judges make decisions that
maximize their policy preferences).
222. See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 79–81
(1998) (arguing that justices are “forward-thinking” actors who make choices
based on what they think will happen in the future); FORREST MALTZMAN, JAMES
F. SPRIGGS II & PAUL J WAHLBECK, CRAFTING THE LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT
(2000) (describing a strategic model of judicial decision making that takes into
account the ways in which the predicted actions of other judges and public
officials impact the likelihood that they will effectuate their goals in the long
term).
223. See Cohen, supra note 12, at 737–38 (discussing the benefits of
requiring judges to state reasons as well as the argument that judges’ reasons
are “at best post hoc rationalizations of the results arrived at by instinct or
hunch”).
224. See Nisbett & Wilson, supra note 207, at 209 (“Subjects not only failed
to report some influential factors, also they sometimes reported that particular
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or may not correspond to those reported by judges. 225 Imposing
strict reason-giving requirements on judges may yield
insincerity and artificiality in judicial discourse, rather than
promoting accountability and transparency. 226
C. Efficiency Reasons
Finally, there are pragmatic reasons against reason-giving.
Judges at all levels face increasing caseload pressures. 227 One
cannot deny the pragmatic difficulties that the federal court
system faces in adjudicating the ever-increasing number of
cases that are filed each year. 228 The sheer volume of judicial
decisions is clearly the primary obstacle to giving reasons. 229
According to the 2013 annual report of the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts, 375,870 combined criminal and
civil cases were filed last year in the district courts and close to
56,475 appeals were filed in the federal courts of appeals. 230 In
factors had influenced their behavior when the experimental evidence suggested
they had had no such effects. These erroneous reports were found in several
studies.”).
225. See id. (explaining how individuals can fabricate reasons for decisions
upon being questioned to do so).
226. See generally Mathilde Cohen, Reason Giving in Court Practice:
Decision-Makers at the Crossroads, 14 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 257 (2008) (arguing
based on empirical research carried out in a French court that judicial reasongiving can be so distorted as to effectively shield judges from accountability);
Cohen, supra note 12 (discussing the connection between reason-giving and
insincerity in the law).
227. See, e.g., Thomas B. Marvell, Are Caseloads Really Increasing—Yes, 25
JUDGES J. 34, 35 (1986) (“On average, state trial court filings are doubling about
every 15 to 20 years and appeals are doubling each decade.”).
228. See generally Lauren K. Robel, Caseload and Judging: Judicial
Adaptations to Caseload, 1990 BYU L. REV. 3 (discussing the procedural
“innovations and techniques adopted by some judges to deal with the caseload
pressures” and subsequent criticism).
229. See id. at 39–46 (discussing how increased caseload provides judges
with less time to address the issues and how many judges delegate opinion
drafting to clerks).
230. See
Annual
Report
of
the
Director,
ADMIN.
OFF.
U.S. COURTS, w w w . u s c o u r t s . g o v / S t a t i s t i c s / J u d i c i a l B u s i n e ss/2013.asp
x (last visited Jan. 11, 2015, 11:49 AM) (listing the number of filings for the U.S.
courts of appeals and the U.S. district courts) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
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2012, the U.S. Supreme Court received 7,509 certiorari
petitions.231
Can the 677 district judges and the 179 federal appellate
judges, even with the help of other court personnel, 232
thoroughly explain all their decisions to dispose of cases on
procedural grounds or on the merits? Could Supreme Court
Justices give reasons to explain all their denials of certiorari in
addition to issuing opinions for cases decided on the merits?
Even assuming that systematic reason-giving would be
feasible, it might not be normatively desirable for deeper
efficiency reasons.233 Giving reasons for so many decisions might
come at too high a cost: it might jeopardize other values of the
judicial process such as the speedy resolution of disputes and
high quality reason-giving in the subset of cases that are truly
lawmaking.234 Universal reason-giving would also compromise
judges’ case-management responsibilities.235 As they make
decisions, judges must not only balance justifications for reasongiving against institutional and cognitive reasons for not giving
reasons, but also against their need to manage their
workload.236 Judges’ case-management responsibilities give rise
to incentives to get cases resolved and off the docket. 237
231. See id. at tbl. A-1 (listing all certiorari petitions).
232. See
Federal
Judgeships,
U.S.
COURTS,
www.uscourts.
gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/FederalJudgeships.aspx (Jan. 11, 2015, 12:24 PM)
(listing the total number of judgeships) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review). These figures are understood broadly to include non-permanent
personnel such as law clerks, but also permanent personnel such as magistrate
judges, staff attorneys, administrators, and court reporters.
233. The most obvious structural response would be to increase the number
of judges. See, e.g., Stephen Reinhardt, Too Few Judges, Too Many Cases, 79
A.B.A. J. 52, 53 (1993) (proposing doubling the size of the courts of appeals); see
also Martha J. Dragich, Once a Century: Time for a Structural Overhaul of the
Federal Courts, 1996 W IS . L. REV. 11, 45–49 (summarizing arguments for and
against adding judgeships). But see Michael Abramowicz, En Banc Revisited,
100 COL . L. REV. 1600, 1603–04 (2000) (pointing out that when Congress did
provide more judgeships, the caseload grew even faster).
234. See Cohen, supra note 12, at 1116 (“Major impediments to sincere
reason-giving lie in time limitations and in an endemic lack of resources.”).
235. See id. (noting these same impediments to sincere reason-giving).
236. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 7 HARV. L. REV. 374, 378 (1982)
(“Judges have described their new tasks as ‘case management.’”).
237. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92
YALE L.J. 1442, 1445 (1983) (critiquing the increasing bureaucratization of the
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“Managerial judges” are concerned with saving time, reducing
delays, and improving efficiency. 238 In this view, a primary task
judges face, at least at the trial and intermediate appellate
levels, is the need to move the docket and that goal would be
undermined by a general mandate to give reasons. 239
To be sure, judges sitting on different courts face different
sets of tasks and demands. For district judges, giving oral
reasons for granting or denying a non-dispositive pretrial
motion may be subject to different constraints than writing an
opinion after having reached a verdict in a bench trial.240 For
circuit judges, affirming a well-reasoned district court decision
in a well-settled area of law may not call for as much
explanatory work as would a case of first impression likely to
have national repercussions.241 Finally, efficiency reasons for not
giving reasons play out quite differently at the U.S. Supreme
Court given that Justices enjoy even more latitude over their
agenda than any other court: by granting or denying certiorari,
they effectively pick and choose the cases for which they want to
give reasons.242
Judicial reason-giving implicates a wide variety of
objectives. Judges may be required to balance democratic
reasons for reason-giving against institutional, cognitive and
efficiency reasons not to give reasons. 243 A comparison of the civil
judiciary).
238. See Resnik, supra note 236, at 378 (defining the term “managerial
judge”).
239. See supra notes 226–232 and accompanying text (discussing how the
increasing judicial workload is an obstacle to reason giving).
240. See Jack B. Weinstein, The Roles of a Federal District Court Judge, 76
BROOK. L. REV. 439, 440 (2011) (discussing some of the benefits of a “short oral
ruling” from the bench and a “polished decision designed for print”).
241. Cf. Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor, 73 TEX.
L. REV. 1307, 1329 (1995) (discussing how certain situations would limit judicial
candor in opinion writing such as “fashioning new legal doctrines, extending
existing doctrines into new and often controversial areas, and confronting
questions that place the courts in unusually awkward . . . relationships vis-àvis . . . the public”).
242. See H.W. PERRY, DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT 6 (1991) (describing the U.S. Supreme Court as “an
institution that has virtually complete discretion in setting its own agenda”).
243. One may wonder how judges could be asked to balance the cognitive
reasons for not giving reasons given that those reasons involve an element of
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law and the common law judicial systems suggests, however, that
different legal systems have adopted contrasting approaches to
resolve this tension.244 The entity in charge of balancing all these
reasons for and against giving reasons is distinct depending on the
local legal culture.245 In the United States federal courts system, the
judges are making the choice, while in the civil law systems of
continental Europe, it is in principle left to the drafters of the
Constitution or the legislature.246 In what follows, I take each system
in turn and argue that these two judicial cultures have developed
reason-giving methodologies that are more analogous than it seems
at first.
IV. Federal Courts Balance and Require
Legal scholars have observed that there has never been a
common law duty for judges to give reasons,247 but what this Part
shows is that American federal judges are under no affirmative duty
to provide reasons for all of their rulings. In deciding whether and
how many reasons to give, they have been free to balance the
justifications for and the reasons against reason-giving.248 In certain
contexts, however, such as immigration and sentencing, judges have
self-deception or at least unconsciousness. Dan Kahan’s work can be read as an
attempt to make these cognitive biases widely known so that legal actors—
Justices in particular—become more aware of them and take them into account
when justifying their decisions. See Kahan, supra note 208, at 65 (arguing that
“a clear account of these dynamics . . . can equip us to identify what should be
done, and by whom, to repair the Court’s capacity to keep the liberal peace”).
244. See generally Martin Shapiro, The Giving Reasons Requirement, 1992
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 179 (comparing the American reason-giving requirement in
administrative law with its European counterpart).
245. See Vlad Perju, Reasons and Authority in the European Court of
Justice, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 307, 315–26 (2009) (discussing the administrative,
legislative, and judicial reasons for reason-giving in the European context).
246. See supra notes 44–45 and infra Part V (listing the reason-giving
requirements of various foreign countries).
247. See, e.g., David Dyzenhaus & Michael Taggart, Reasoned Decisions and
Legal Theory, in DOUGLAS E. EDLIN (ED.) COMMON LAW T HEORY 135 (2007) (“It
is almost an assumption . . . that judges are under a duty to give
reasons . . . this assumption has hardly ever been the case. It is still not the
case . . . [but] the law is beginning to recognize such a duty.”).
248. See infra note 254 and accompanying text (explaining how federal
courts have never had an affirmative reason-giving requirement).
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deemed the justifications for reason-giving particularly compelling,
and have developed judge-made reason-giving requirements similar
in certain respects to civil law reason-giving requirements.249
A. No Affirmative Duty in the Federal Courts
A few statutory and doctrinal mechanisms exist to constrain
federal judges’ reason-giving, but they do not amount to a universal
duty to give reasons.250 A court must enter some judgment in order to
dispose of a case, but need not necessarily provide an explanation of
that judgment. 251 Unlike some of their state 252 or
249. See infra Part IV.B (discussing reason-giving in the sentencing and
immigration context).
250. The statutory mechanisms are very limited. Examples include the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandate that district judges find the facts
specially and state their conclusions of law. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)
(articulating this mandate). Additionally, in the sentencing context, district
judges have a duty to “state in open court the reasons” for imposing a particular
sentence. 18 U.S.C § 35.53(c) (2012).
251. See FED. R. CIV. P. 58 (noting that for district court, “[e]very judgment
and amended judgment must be set out in a separate document”). For courts of
appeals, see FED. R. APP. P. 36(a) (“A judgment is entered when it is noted on the
docket.”). For the U.S. Supreme Court, see SUP. CT. R. 41 (“Opinions of the
Court will be released by the Clerk immediately upon their announcement from
the bench, or as the Court otherwise directs.” (emphasis added)); see also Merrill,
supra note 157, at 62 (“[J]udicial opinions are simply explanations for
judgments—essays written by judges explaining why they rendered the
judgment they did.”).
252. A number of state constitutions currently provide constitutional
requirements for judges to give reasons, write opinions, or both. These state
requirements usually apply only to the state Supreme Court, but a few also
apply generally to all the courts of the state. See ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, § 20 (“The
decisions of the supreme court shall be in writing and the grounds stated.”);
CALIF. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (“In the determination of causes [by the Supreme
Court], all decisions of the court in bank or in department, shall be given in
writing, and the grounds of the decision shall be stated.”); MD. CONST. art. IV,
§ 15 (“In every [Supreme Court] case an opinion, in writing, shall be filed within
three months after the argument or submission of the cause”); MICH. CONST. art.
VI, § 6 (“Decisions of the supreme court . . . shall be in writing and shall contain
a concise statement of the facts and reasons for each decision and reasons for
each denial of leave to appeal.”); MO. CONST. art. V, § 12 (“The opinions of the
supreme court and court of appeals and all divisions or districts of said courts
shall be in writing and filed in the respective causes, and shall become a part of
the records of the court, be available for publication, and shall be public
records.”); NEV. CONST. art. XV, § 8 (“The Legislature shall provide for the
speedy publication of . . . such decisions of the Supreme Court, as it may deem
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foreign253 counterparts, who often operate under constitutional or
statutory reason-giving requirements, federal judges exercise
wide discretion as to whether or not explain their decisions.254
expedient.”); OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 2(C) (“The decisions in all cases in the
Supreme Court shall be reported, together with the reasons therefor.”); ORE.
CONST. art. VII, § 4 (“At the close of each term the supreme court’s judges shall
file with the secretary of state concise written statements of the decisions made
at that term.”); WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (“In the determination of causes all
decisions of the supreme court shall be given in writing and the grounds of the
decision shall be stated.”); W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 4 (“When a judgment or
order of another court is reversed, modified or affirmed by the supreme court,
every point fairly arising upon the record shall be considered and decided; the
reasons therefor shall be concisely stated in writing and preserved with the
record.”).
A few states used to have constitutional reason-giving requirements that
were later repealed. For example, until 1970, the Indiana constitution provided,
“The Supreme Court shall, upon the decision of every case, give a statement in
writing of each question arising in the record of such case, and the decision of
the Court thereon.” IND. CONST. art. VII, § 5 (repealed 1970); see also LA. CONST.
art. VII, §1 (repealed) (“The judges of all courts shall refer to the law and adduce
the reasons on which every definitive judgment is founded.”); OKLA. CONST. art.
VII, § 5 (repealed 1967) (“The Supreme Court shall render a written opinion in
each case.”); S.C. CONST. art. V, § 8 (repealed 1971)
When a judgment or decree is reversed or affirmed by the
Supreme Court, every point made and distinctly stated in the
cause and fairly arising upon the record of the case shall be
considered and decided and the reason thereof shall be concisely
and briefly stated in writing and preserved with the record of
the case.;
UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 25 (repealed 1984) (“When a judgment or decree is
reversed, modified or affirmed by the Supreme Court, the reasons therefor shall
be stated concisely in writing, signed by the judges concurring, filed in the office
of the Clerk of the Supreme Court, and preserved with the record of the case.”).
A few states have statutory reason-giving requirements. See, e.g., MD. CODE
ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 12-203 (West 2013) (“Reasons for the denial of the writ
shall be in writing.”); IND. CODE §§ 33-24-3-2, 33-25-3-6 (West 2013) (“The
judicial opinion or decision in each case determined by the supreme court shall
be reduced to writing [and] [t]he judicial opinion or decision in each case
determined by the court of appeals shall be reduced to writing.”).
253. See supra notes 44–45 and infra Part V (listing the reason-giving
requirements of various foreign countries). See generally Shapiro, supra note
244 (comparing the American reason-giving requirement in administrative law
with its European counterpart).
254. Historically, there has never been an affirmative reason-giving
requirement bearing on the federal courts. While the Judiciary Act of 1789
required the clerks of all federal courts to maintain accurate records of the
orders, decrees, judgments, and proceedings of the courts, it remained silent
about judicial opinions. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 7, 1 Stat. 73, 76
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The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently sustained the
discretionary nature of judicial reason-giving.255 To be sure,
guidelines exist in the form of local rules of civil and appellate
procedure or internal operating procedures for when judges ought
to publish their opinions if they choose to write any.256 But these
rules are usually silent as to the first-order question of whether
judges should offer reason dispositions in the first place.257
1. Administrators Must Give Reasons, Not Judges
The reason-giving requirement is a staple of the exercise of
administrative function in modern bureaucratic states.258 As
Jerry Mashaw has shown, the right to reasons in American
(1789); see also John Harrison, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction
of Federal Courts and the Text of Article III, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 203, 230 (1997)
(noting that “[n]either the Constitution nor the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided
for the delivery of written opinions, let alone their public distribution”).
255. See, e.g., Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U.S. 191, 194 n.4 (1972) (“We, of
course, agree that the courts of appeals should have wide latitude in their
decisions of whether or how to write opinions.”); Conn. Bd. of Pardons v.
Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 472 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Judges often
decide difficult and important cases without explaining their reasons, and I
would not suggest that they thereby commit constitutional error.”).
256. See supra note 57 (listing examples of local court rules requiring
opinions). For a complete list of current local rules, see Federal Rules of Practice
& Procedure, U.S. COURTS, h t t p : / / w w w . u s c o u r t s . g o v / R u l e s A n dPolicies/Fe
deralRulemaking/LocalCourtRules.aspx (last visited Jan. 14, 2015, 3:45 PM) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
257. See supra note 57 (listing examples of local court rules requiring
opinions); Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, What Do Federal
District Judges Want? An Analysis of Publications, Citations, and Reversals, 27
J.L. & ECON. ORG. 1, 7 (2011) (pointing out that despite the existence of
guidelines directing judges when to publish opinions, research shows that
judges fail to follow them); see also Donald R. Songer, Danna Smith & Reginald
S. Sheehan, Nonpublication in the United States District Courts: Official Criteri
Versus Inferences from Appellate Review, 50 J. POL. 206, 207 (1988) (discussing
the arguments in favor of limited publication of judicial opinions); Susan M.
Olson, Studying Federal District Courts Through Published Cases: A Research
Note, 15 JUSTICE SYST. J. 782, 784–88 (1992) (discussing the process of how a
case gets published).
258. See Shapiro & Levy, supra note 54, at 425–28 (recounting the history
of the American reason-giving requirement and depicting it as a manifestation
of a separation-of-powers principle). See generally Shapiro, supra note 244
(comparing the American reason-giving requirement in administrative law with
its European counterpart).
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administrative law is contingent on other rights or on the
necessities of effective judicial review.259 The underlying idea is
that if in fact administrative judgments are reviewable by courts,
then agencies must provide judges with a record of their decisionmaking processes and their justifications for reaching a
particular outcome.260 Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that the duty to give reasons is a function of due
process in the administrative context.261 Administrative reasongiving requirements have been analyzed as a due process
protection designed to ensure that agencies do not act in an
arbitrary manner.262 Whether reason-giving is required by the
259. See Mashaw, supra note 163, at 105–12 (2007) (discussing the right to
reasons in American administrative law); see also Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary
Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479,
491 (2010) (pointing out that “part of the explanation for this expansion of
substantive judicial scrutiny of agency decisionmaking lies in constitutional
concerns with broad delegations of power to agencies and the attendant risk of
unaccountable and arbitrary exercises of administrative power”).
260. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (establishing procedural requirements in
informal rulemaking that were not specified in the APA: an agency “must
examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its
action including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice
made’” (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168
(1962))); see also Peter L. Strauss, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe—
Of Politics and Law, Young Lawyers and the Highway Goliath, in
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 258 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006).
261. The doctrine of judicial review of administrative action is extremely
complex, but it is safe to say that the Supreme Court has articulated an agency’s
duty to give reasons in two landmark cases: S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S.
194 (1947) and Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). For a discussion of
the complexity of the doctrine on this, see David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96
VA. L. REV. 135, 135 (2010) (arguing that the six separate tests that exist to
review agencies’ decisions should be simplified into a “reasonable agency”
standard). In individual cases, the Court has held that the due process reasongiving requirement applies only to actions threatening people’s “life, liberty, and
property” under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599 (1972) (“We
have held . . . that the Constitution does not require opportunity for a
hearing . . . unless [the respondent] can show that the decision . . . somehow
deprived him of an interest in ‘liberty’ or . . . ‘property.’”); Bd. of Regents of State
Coll. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569–70 (1972) (“The requirements of procedural due
process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the
Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.”).
262. See Lisa Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An
Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1690–92 (2004) (discussing
agency requirements for reason-giving to avoid improper influences dominating
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Constitution263 or by a statute supplemented by the
Administrative Procedure Act,264 it is considered one of the
standard features of the right to a hearing itself.265
The federal courts, however, including the Supreme Court,266
enjoy wide latitude about whether or how to explain their
the agency decisions at the public’s expense).
263. See Mashaw, supra note 163, at 111 (pointing out the constitutional
basis of the reason-giving requirement in American administrative law); see also
Richard W. Murphy, The Limits of Legislative Control Over the “Hard-Look,” 56
ADMIN. L. REV. 1125, 1132–34 (2004) (arguing that hard-look review has a
constitutional dimension).
264. To ensure that agencies do not act in an arbitrary manner, two
statutory reason-giving requirements have developed in administrative law. The
first is found in § 555(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C.
§ 556(e) (2012). It requires federal agencies to provide a “brief statement of the
grounds for denial” when denying written petitions or applications. Id. This
means that an agency must provide a written explanation when it denies either
a rulemaking petition or a petition for enforcement action. See Massachusetts v.
E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 533 (2007) (stating that the agency can “avoid taking
further action . . . if . . . it provides some reasonable explanation as to why it
cannot or will not” act). In the context of informal adjudication, when denying a
written application or a petition made in connection with an agency proceeding,
an agency must provide a “brief statement of the grounds for denial.” See id.
(stating that the agency can “avoid taking further action . . . if . . . it provides
some reasonable explanation as to why it cannot or will not” act).
Section 706(2)(A) of the APA creates a second, heightened, reason-giving
requirement. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012) (instructing reviewing courts to
hold “unlawful . . . agency action . . . found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion”). The Court has interpreted this section as requiring agencies to
justify their decisions with adequate reasons: “[T]he agency must examine the
relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a
‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’” Motor
Vehicle Mfg. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156,
168 (1962)). This version of the requirement allows the judiciary, the executive,
and the public at large to check the reasons supporting agencies’ exercises of
delegated discretion and to guard against arbitrariness. See supra note 262, at
1690 (discussing how reason-giving reduces the opportunity for “covert, privateinterested, or otherwise arbitrary” decisions).
265. See Eduardo Jordão & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Judicial Review of
Executive Policymaking in Advanced Democracies: Beyond Rights Review, 66
ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 47 (2014) (“[T]he agency should go through a process of
learning ‘through reasoned argument’ that would have been provided by the
notice-and-comment provisions of the APA. That process, of course, might
require open-ended hearings to get public input and reason-giving designed for
both the court and the public.”).
266. See SUP. CT. R. 41 (providing that the “opinions of the Court will be
released by the Clerk immediately upon their announcement from the bench, or
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decisions.267 The Supreme Court is no more under a duty to give
reasons, let alone to write them up in an opinion, than district or
appellate judges are.268 Yet federal judges at all levels of the
judicial hierarchy are prolific reason-givers.269 Reason-giving is so
instinctive and commonplace in the U.S. judicial culture that the
practice has hardly needed formalization.270 What is striking from
a comparative law perspective is that reason-giving talk is
usually associated with an administrative doctrine, not a
procedural doctrine pertaining to the judicial context.271 The due
process clause requires that a person receive notice and an
opportunity for a hearing when the Government deprives him or

as the Court otherwise directs” (emphasis added)); see also Edward A. Hartnett,
A Matter of Judgment, Not a Matter of Opinion, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 123, 146
(1999) (pointing out that “the Supreme Court has no legal obligation to issue
opinions”).
267. A case like Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1981), could lead one to
think that the Court was embarking on a path leading to the imposition of a
constitutional reasons requirement upon federal judges. Mathews sets forth a
“balancing” test for determining whether particular procedures, including the
reason-giving requirement, are required as a part of a hearing process in the
administrative context. See id. at 334 (“[D]ue process, unlike some legal rules, is
not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances. Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections
as the particular situation demands.” (quotations and citations omitted)).
However, the Justices have expressed reluctance to consider judicial reasongiving as a requirement of due process. See, e.g., Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U.S.
191, 194 n.4 (1972) (“We, of course, agree that the courts of appeals should have
wide latitude in their decisions of whether or how to write opinions.”).
268. Historically, there has never been an affirmative reason-giving
requirement bearing on the federal courts. See Harrison, supra note 254, at 230
(noting that “[n]either the Constitution nor the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided
for the delivery of written opinions, let alone their public distribution”).
269. See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Mr. Justice Posner? Unpacking
the Statistics, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 19, 23 (2005) (discussing the number
of opinions federal circuit judges author).
270. See Cohen, supra note 114, at 259 (“[I]n most contemporary legal
systems, there is a requirement—formal or informal—for courts, administrative
agencies, and other public institutions to provide reasons for their decisions.”).
271. See S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943) (distinguishing the
Chenery doctrine under which the courts can affirm an administrative decision
only on the actual basis used by the administrative agency to reach that
decision from “the settled rule that, in reviewing the decision of a lower court, it
must be affirmed if the result is correct ‘although the lower court relied upon a
wrong ground or gave a wrong reason’” (quoting Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S.
238, 245 (1937))).
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her of life, liberty, or property.272 A court must give affected
parties notice and a hearing before it acts,273 but unlike
administrators, it is exempt from a constitutional reason-giving
requirement.274 Justice Stevens’s dissent in Connecticut Board of
Pardons v. Dumschat275 is enlightening in this respect. Stevens
emphasizes that “a brief statement of reasons is an essential
element of the process that is due” to prison inmates when a
Board of Pardons decides on the commutation of a sentence. 276
But he distinguishes the situation of courts from that of Board of
Pardons. Judges are not subject to a reason-giving requirement
because the judicial setting affords litigants other procedural
protections: “Judges often decide difficult and important cases
without explaining their reasons, and I would not suggest that
they thereby commit constitutional error. But the ordinary
litigant has other substantial procedural safeguards against
arbitrary decision-making in the courtroom.”277
2. The Only Judicial Duty Is to Enable Review
In the judicial context, the reason-giving doctrine has focused
on providing higher courts with a mechanism to facilitate their
review of lower courts’ decisions rather than on securing the
public’s understanding of judicial decisions.278 In the common law
tradition, judicial reason-giving does not attach to individual
right holders.279 Litigants or defendants have no enforceable right
272. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV (“No person shall be . . . deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”).
273. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313
(1950) (“Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of
the Due Process Clause, but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they
require that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded
by notice and opportunity for a hearing . . . .”).
274. See Harrison, supra note 254, at 230 (“Neither the Constitution nor the
Judiciary Act of 1789 provided for the delivery of written opinions, let alone
their public distribution.”).
275. 452 U.S. 458 (1981).
276. Id. at 472 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
277. Id.
278. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing accountability reasons for judicial
reason-giving).
279. See Conn. Bd. of Pardons, 452 U.S. at 472 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
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to reasoned decisions; a judge’s failure to give reasons does not
amount to reversible error.280 The validity of the judgment is
evaluated independently from the reasons given for it.281
Unreasoned decisions are protected by the “harmless error”
doctrine.282 The rationale behind this rule appears to be judicial
economy.283 No appeal lies on the grounds that a court gave
inadequate or insufficient reasons.284 A successful appeal must
contend that the judgment was incorrect and thus warrants
reversal.285 This is not the case in many parts of the world.286
(“But the ordinary litigant has other substantial procedural safeguards against
arbitrary decision making in the courtroom.”).
280. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things Like Reasons Are Put in a Jar:
Reason and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 20
(2001) (noting that a common ground for reversal of an administrative order is
the failure to state adequate reasons, but pointing out that the fact “that a
lower court gave the wrong reasons for a correct decision is not by itself a
justification for reversal or remand”); see also Stack, supra note 50, at
955 (noting that if the “decision below is correct, it must be affirmed, although
the lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason”).
281. See Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245 (1937) (“In the review of
judicial proceedings the rule is settled that, if the decision below is correct, it
must be affirmed although the lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a
wrong reason.”).
282. See FED. R. CIV. P. 61 (requiring that federal courts “disregard all errors
and defects that do not affect any party’s substantial rights”); see also Mary M.
Schroeder, Appellate Justice Today: Fairness or Formulas, The Fairchild
Lecture, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 9, 10 (pointing out that in determining that an error
was harmless, appellate judges “decide that even if there was a legal violation it
would not have changed the result. [They] avoid deciding whether there was a
legal violation by discarding the question”); Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn
Bassett, The End of Law, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1, 38–40 (2004) (criticizing the
harmless error doctrine as a way for courts to avoid and obscure the law).
283. See supra Part IV.A.2 (discussing efficiency reasons for not giving
reasons).
284. See People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17,
23 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“In cases on appeal from the district court, we are to
review judgments, not opinions. Orders issued by agencies . . . we do not sustain
a ‘right-result, wrong-reason’ decision of an agency. We send the case back to
the agency [to] fix its reasoning or change its result.” (internal citations
omitted)).
285. See Chevron, U.S.A. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842
(1984) (“[S]ince this Court reviews judgments, not opinions, we must determine
whether the Court of Appeals’ legal error resulted in an erroneous judgment.”
(emphasis added)).
286. In a number of civil law jurisdictions, the inexistence of reasons is
considered a procedural defect that warrants voiding the judgment altogether.

534

72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 483 (2015)

Federal courts are free to decide cases without providing
reasons or with minimal reasons, except when the absence of
reasons would entirely frustrate review.287 A reviewing court
unable to discern how a lower court reached its decision may
remand for further proceedings.288 Historically, this has been the
purpose of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a),289 which
requires that in bench trials district judges make findings of fact
and draw conclusions of law.290 The purpose of requiring findings
See, e.g., Nouveau Code de Procédure Civile [C.P.C.], arts. 455, 458 (observing
that where reasons are insufficient, contradictory, or unclear, the reviewing
court will generally reverse and remand to the lower court for adequate reasongiving).
This attitude toward insufficient reasons is not unheard of in common law
jurisdictions such as England. See, e.g., H.L. Ho, The Judicial Duty to Give
Reasons, 20 LEGAL STUD. 42, 46–47 (2000) (pointing out “that the failure to
give reasons is a good self-standing ground of appeal was acknowledged by the
English Court of Appeal . . . failure of a judge to give reasons adequately when
he or she is legally required to do so has been treated as an error of law . . . the
usual (and perhaps most effective) remedy for this failure is a retrial”).
This is also the Canadian approach. See, e.g., Michael Taggart, Should
Canadian Judges Be Legally Required to Give Reasoned Decisions in Civil
Cases?, 33 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 8 (1983) (pointing out that in Canadian courts “it
has always been the case that a trial judge’s failure to state facts and reasons
in civil cases . . . might, in certain circumstances, result in reversal by the
appellate court . . . recent cases appear to go further and suggest that something
akin to a legal obligation to state findings and reasons exists”); see also Hamish
Stewart, The Trial Judge’s Duty to Give Reasons for Judgment in Criminal
Cases, 14 CAN. CRIM. L. REV. 19, 24 (2009) (showing that failure for trial judges
to give reasons for judgments in criminal cases, in particular to explain why
they have treated the evidence in a certain way, often amounts to a reversible
error).
287. See Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U.S. 191, 194 n.4 (1972) (“Because this
record does not fully inform us of the precise nature of the litigation . . . [we]
vacate the judgment below, and remand.”).
288. See id. (“Because this record does not fully inform us of the precise
nature of the litigation . . . [we] vacate the judgment below, and remand.”).
289. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) (“In an action tried on the facts without a jury . . .
the court must find the facts . . . and state its conclusions of law . . . . The
findings and conclusions may be stated on the record . . . [or] may appear in an
opinion or a memorandum of decision.”).
290. See id. (requiring courts to find facts and state conclusions). Courts of
appeals, however, construe findings liberally in support of a judgment, even if
the findings are not as specific or detailed as might be desired. See Zack v. CIR,
291 F.3d 407, 412 (6th Cir. 2002) (stating that “‘findings are to be liberally
construed in support of a judgment’” (quoting In re Fordu, 301 F.3d 693, 710
(6th Cir. 1999))). Compliance with Rule 52(a) is not jurisdictional and the
appellate court may decide the appeal without further findings if it feels that it
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of fact by the trial court, as has been recognized in a significant
number of cases, is limited to enabling review by the appellate
court by affording it an explicit explanation or at least a record
indicating the ground of the trial court’s decision.291 This rule is
the closest equivalent to a reason-giving requirement in the
federal judiciary, but it falls short of imposing that district judges
explain their decisions in writing.292
A 1972 reapportionment case, Taylor v. McKeither,293
illustrates both the Supreme Court’s broad grant of discretion to
federal judges in determining whether or not to give reasons and
its limiting courts’ freedom in exceptional circumstances. In this
case, the Court vacated and remanded a Fifth Circuit summary
reversal because its lack of reasons did not allow for meaningful
review.294 The Fifth Circuit had reversed, without opinion or any
other form of explanation, a district court’s approval of a
reapportionment plan.295 In doing so, the appellate judges
adopted a competing plan that would have reinforced the dilution
of the African-American vote.296 The Supreme Court could not
determine whether a substantial federal question existed because
it was unsure of the appellate court’s reasoning. In an unusual
move, the Court vacated the summary reversal and remanded the
is in a position to do so. See, e.g., United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073, 1079
(9th Cir. 2005) (“We conclude that the best way to deal with this . . . is to follow
the approach adopted by our colleagues on [other circuit courts] and ask the
person who knows the answer, the sentencing judge. Rather than affirm . . . we
elect to remand.”).
291. See Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 7 (2006) (deciding on the trial
court’s ultimate findings because the Ninth Circuit issued a decision without
reasoning or findings before the trial court had issued findings of fact).
292. See 9C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 2571 (3d ed. 2008) (pointing out that Rule 52(a) was amended
in 1948 and 1983 making clear that findings and conclusions are unnecessary on
the decision of most motions and to provide explicitly that the district judge may
make the findings and conclusions orally in open court and have them recorded).
293. 407 U.S. 191 (1972).
294. See id. at 194 (“Because this record does not fully inform us of the
precise nature of the litigation . . . [we] vacate the judgment below, and
remand.”).
295. See id. at 194 n.4 (“[H]ere the lower court summarily reversed without
any opinion on a point that had been considered at length by the District
Judge.”).
296. See id. at 193 (“[T]he Court of Appeals reversed without opinion and
adopted the Attorney General’s alternative division.”).
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case to the court of appeals for further proceedings, “because
this record does not fully inform us of the precise nature of the
litigation, and because we have not had the benefit of the insight
of the Court of Appeals.”297 In a footnote, the Court emphasized
the exceptional nature of its request for reason-giving, observing
that “the courts of appeals should have wide latitude in their
decisions of whether or how to write opinions. That is especially
true with respect to summary affirmances.”298 In short, so long as
the record available to the reviewing court enables some form of
review, there is no reason-giving requirement bearing on federal
judges.299
In practice, because insufficient or non-existent reasongiving may contribute to inaccurate or unjust judicial outcomes,
federal judges have generally been generous reason-givers when
they have found the justifications for reason-giving to outweigh
the costs of reason-giving.300 The next subpart presents two case
studies showing that in the two contexts of immigration and
sentencing, the federal courts of appeals have developed reasongiving doctrines that aim at securing (some of) the values of
reason-giving identified in Part I.
B. Yet Courts Balance and Require
Immigration and sentencing are two areas in which triallevel adjudicators are required by the reviewing court to give
reasons for their decisions in an administrative law-like
fashion.301
Trial-level immigration adjudication is
an
297. Id. at 194.
298. Id. at 194 n.4 (citation omitted); see also United States v. Edge Broad.
Co., 509 U.S. 418, 425 n.3 (1993) (observing it was “remarkable and unusual
that although the Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment that an Act of Congress
was unconstitutional as applied, the court found it appropriate to announce its
judgment in an unpublished per curiam opinion”).
299. See Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (stating that “by failing to
provide any factual findings or indeed any reasoning of its own the Court of
Appeals left this Court in the position of evaluating the Court of Appeals’ bare
order in light of the District Court’s ultimate findings”).
300. See supra Part III.B (discussing the efficiency reasons for not giving
reasons).
301. Immigration adjudication is literally administrative at the trial level
and at the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) level, as immigration judges and
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administrative form of adjudication conducted by Immigration
Courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which
comprise the two levels of the Executive Office for Immigration
Review (EOIR).302 Similarly, sentencing has arguably acquired a
quasi-administrative quality since the establishment of the U.S.
Sentencing Commission and the articulation of the first Federal
Sentencing Guidelines303 together with a statutory duty for
sentencing judges to state reasons for the sentence.304 Perhaps
because these two decision-making contexts lack the traditional
procedural safeguards and concepts of the American civil common
BIA members are employees of the Department of Justice and comprised within
the so-called Office for Immigration Review (EOIR). See generally Jill E. Family,
Conflicting Signals: Understanding U.S. Immigration Reform Through the
Evolution of U.S. Immigration Law, 40 REVISTA CATALANA DE DRET PUBLIC 145
[40 CATALAN J. OF PUB. L. 145] (2010) (Spain) (recounting the history and
evolution of administrative adjudication and its lack of decisional independence
from immigration agencies). The administrative color of sentencing is not as
clear. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989) (holding that the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was a constitutional delegation of powers). A
number of scholars, however, have pointed out that the institution of sentencing
guidelines has fundamentally altered sentencing and brought it closer to an
administrative model of decision making in which, even after United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), district judges’ discretion is bounded by the
guidelines. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV.
715, 721–23 (2004) (arguing that the sentencing commission is best understood
under an agency model).
302. See About the Office, DEP’T OF JUSTICE EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION
REVIEW, www.justice.gov/eoir/orginfo.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2015 12:42 PM)
(“The BIA has been given nationwide jurisdiction to hear appeals from certain
decisions rendered by immigration judges and by district directors of the
Department of Homeland Security.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
303. One could argue that even the transformation of the federal guidelines
into an advisory system following the Apprendi–Booker line of cases has not
entirely counteracted the administrative quality of sentencing. The Guidelines
are passed by an administrative agency and approved by Congress. Though
advisory, their use remains mandatory. They assign preferred outcomes to
identified facts. See generally United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005);
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
304. A sentencing court “shall state in open court the reasons for its
imposition of the particular sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2012). If the sentence
is not of the kind prescribed by, or is outside the range of, the sentencing
guidelines referred to in § 3553(a)(4), the court shall indicate the specific
reasons for imposing a sentence different from the guidelines. Id. § 3553(c)(2).
These “reasons must also be stated with specificity” in the written order of
judgment and commitment. Id.
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law—such as Article III judges, jury decision making and full
judicial autonomy—federal judges have imposed a blanket
reason-giving mandate, in a move that evokes the civil law
legislative reason-giving requirements.305
1. Context 1: Immigration
Immigration courts adjudicate individual claims concerning a
noncitizen’s legal right to remain in the country.306 They make
determinations
of
removability,
deportability,
and
307
excludability. This adjudication takes the form of a traditional
hearing involving two parties, and each case involves the
interpretation or application of law, findings of fact based on
evidence in the record, and the exercise of a specific statutory
discretion.308 The constitutional due process protection requires
no more than a fair administrative proceeding, which is satisfied
by the opportunity for a hearing before an immigration judge.309
Circuit courts, however, have developed a reason-giving

305. See Maritza I. Reyes, Constitutionalizing Immigration Law: The Vital
Role of Judicial Discretion in the Removal of Lawful Permanent Residents, 84
TEMP. L. REV. 637, 651 (2012) (noting that immigration removal proceedings
lack procedural safeguards because deportation is “not a punishment in the
constitutional sense”).
306. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.1(a), 1240.31, 1240.41 (discussing the authority of
immigration judges).
307. See id. (providing that immigration judges have the authority to make
decisions regarding deportation, removability, and exclusion).
308. See OFFICE OF THE CHIEF IMMIGRATION JUDGE, IMMIGRATION COURT
PRACTICE MANUAL 57–83 (2008), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/OCIJPracManual/
Practice_Manual_review.pdf (discussing immigration hearing procedures).
309. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976) (“[D]ifferences in
the origin and function of administrative agencies preclude wholesale
transplantation of the rules of procedure, trial, and review which have evolved
from the history and experience of courts.” (citations omitted)); see also
Albathani v. INS, 318 F.3d 365, 376 (1st Cir. 2003) (“An alien has no
constitutional right to any administrative appeal at all.”); Ekasinta v. Gonzales,
415 F.3d 1188, 1195 (10th Cir. 2005) (“The constitution requires no more than a
fair administrative proceeding.”); Kambolli v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 454, 460 (2d
Cir. 2006) (“Kambolli is therefore afforded an opportunity to appeal the IJ’s
[Immigration Judge’s] decision only because Congress and the Attorney General
have chosen to provide an appeals process by statute and regulation.”).
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requirement bearing on first-instance immigration judges—their
decisions must be reasoned, either orally or in writing.310
The main goal behind this requirement is that of ensuring
the meaningful review of non-Article III immigration judges’
decision making by the federal circuits.311 The requirement is
very similar to that which bears on other administrative
agencies.312 Judicial review of administrative action requires
something to review and if the agency provides only its result
without an explanation of the underlying fact finding and
analysis, a court is unable to provide judicial review.313 Judge
Richard Posner clearly expressed the administrative nature of
the reason-giving requirement in the immigration context: “as we
tirelessly repeat, . . . an agency opinion that fails to build a
rational bridge between the record and the agency’s legal
conclusion cannot survive judicial review.”314 Indeed, immigration
courts are not part of the federal judiciary.315 Instead, they are
310. See OFFICE OF PLANNING, ANALYSIS & TECHNOLOGY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE
IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FY 2010 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK D1 fig.4 (2011),
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy10syb.pdf (providing a breakdown of
immigration proceedings by either decision or other completions from fiscal year
2006 to fiscal year 2010).
311. See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 572 (1975) (“[T]o enable the
reviewing court intelligently to review the Secretary’s determination, the
Secretary must provide the court and the complaining witness with copies of a
statement of reasons supporting his determination.”). Petitioners cannot appeal
directly to the circuit courts before exhausting their claim before the BIA. See 8
U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (2012) (providing that a court may not review a final order
until the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies); Morales v. U.S. Att’y
Gen., 210 F. App’x 978, 980 (11th Cir. 2006) (interpreting § 1252(d)(1) to require
the BIA to hear claims before a court may hear the claim).
312. See Donald J. Kochan, The “Reason-Giving” Lawyer: An Ethical,
Practical, and Pedagogical Perspective, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 261, 277 (2013)
(noting that the reason-giving requirement extends to almost all agencies’
actions).
313. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) (“If the
administrative action is to be tested by the basis upon which it purports to rest,
that basis must be set forth with such clarity as to be understandable.”);
Guentchev v. I.N.S., 77 F.3d 1036, 1038 (7th Cir. 1996) (providing a statement
of reasons is the “norm of administrative law”).
314. Mengistu v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1044, 1047 (7th Cir. 2004).
315. Immigration Judges (IJs) and BIA members are outside of the
mainstream judicial profession in terms of recruitment, status, and career. For a
comparison, see CHARLES H. SHELDON & LINDA S. MAULE, CHOOSING JUSTICE:
THE RECRUITMENT OF STATE AND FEDERAL JUDGES (1997). Unlike federal judges,
who are generalists and are expected to deal with all kinds of cases with equal
FOR
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administrative tribunals.316 But immigration courts are not
subject to the Administrative Procedure Act’s formal adjudication
requirement: they are treated as first-instance courts with federal
appellate review.317
Following a growth of immigration appeals that flooded the
courts starting from 2002,318 federal circuits have developed an
skill, IJs and BIA members are specialized immigration law judges. See
Lawrence Baum, Immigration Law and Adjudication: Judicial Specialization
and the Adjudication of Immigration Cases, 59 DUKE L.J. 1501, 1546 (2010)
(discussing IJ’s and BIA’s specialization in contrast to federal judges).
316. Immigration Judges are not considered administrative law judges as
defined by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). See Organization of the
Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Matters, 52 Fed. Reg.
44,971 (Nov. 24, 1987) (changing the title of “Special Inquiry Officer” to
“Immigration Judge”). Rather, immigration courts constitute a unique type of
administrative tribunal, deriving from congressionally delegated authority to
the Department of Justice (DOJ). In 1983 the Attorney General created the
Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) within DOJ. Board of
Immigration Appeals; Immigration Review Function; Editorial Amendments, 48
Fed. Reg. 8,038, 8,039 (Feb. 25, 1983).
317. The 1946 APA “created strict procedural requirements for formal
agency rulemaking and adjudication.” Dory Mitros Durham, Note, The Once and
Future Judge: The Rise and Fall (And Rise?) of Independence in U.S.
Immigration Courts, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 655, 665 (2006). Following its
passage, controversy ensued concerning whether its procedures were meant to
apply in the immigration realm. See id. 666–67 (discussing how DOJ thought
the APA did not apply, but the Supreme Court ruled otherwise). In Wong Yang
Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 49–50 (1950), the Court found that the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause required application of the APA’s strict
procedural requirements. Later that year, however, the agency was successful in
lobbying for an appropriations bill, which exempted it from abiding by the
formal adjudication requirements. See Durham, supra note 317, at 667. Thus,
the changes in the immigration adjudication process were short lived. Since
Wong Yang Sung, however, the process has gradually evolved to more closely
resemble formal adjudication. See id. at 691 (concluding that immigration
adjudication has evolved “in many respects [mirroring] a formal judicial
proceeding”).
318. On the surge and its underlying causes, see Lenni Benson, Making
Paper Dolls: How Restrictions on Judicial Review and the Administrative
Process Increase Immigration Cases in Federal Court, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 37
(2006) (exploring the interconnected factors contributing to the increase in
immigration-related federal court cases); Evelyn H. Cruz, Double the Injustice,
Twice the Harm: The Impact of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ Summary
Affirmance Procedures, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 481 (2005) (describing the
streamlining procedure and its effect on the BIA decision making); see also John
R.B. Palmer, Stephen W. Yale-Loehr & Elizabeth Cronin, Why Are So Many
People Challenging Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions in Federal Court?
An Empirical Analysis of the Recent Surge in Petitions for Review, 20 GEO.
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affirmative reason-giving requirement.319 During the early years
of the surge, circuit judges became increasingly aware of and
outspoken about the insufficient reasoning of immigration
decisions at both the trial and the appellate level.320 They were
adjudicating an unprecedented number of appeals from the BIA,
which has jurisdiction to conduct appellate review of immigration
courts’ decisions.321 Because many of the BIA decisions were
“affirmances without opinions,” circuit judges had to review the
trial-level decisions by immigration judges.322 When the BIA
IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 54–89 (2005) (describing a series of variables that might explain
the surge).
319. The Second Circuit thus declared: “Under applicable laws and
regulations, even after streamlining, an applicant for asylum or withholding of
removal remains entitled to a full hearing on his asylum claims, a reasoned
opinion from the IJ, the opportunity for BIA review, and the right to seek relief
from the courts.” Zhang v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 362 F.3d 155, 159 (2d Cir. 2004)
(emphasis added).
320. See AM. BAR ASS’N, REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 2–26 (2010),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/Immigration/PublicDocu
ments/aba_complete_full_report.authcheckdam.pdf (“[F]ederal appellate judges
have frequently criticized the ill-reasoned and/or incomplete oral decisions of
immigration judges that have reached the circuit courts.”).
321. Once the BIA decides the case, the respondent has a statutory right to
petition for review to the U.S. court of appeals with jurisdiction over the case.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (2012) (providing that a court may review a final order
once an alien has exhausted all administrative remedies).
322. When the BIA adopts and supplements the IJ’s opinion on
administrative appeal of order of removal, the court of appeals reviews the IJ’s
opinion as supplemented by the BIA. See Immigration and Nationality Act,
§ 242(b)(4)(A)–(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A)–(B) (2012) (providing the court of
appeals’ scope and standard of review). As the Eleventh Circuit observed in
Mendoza v. U.S. Attorney General, 327 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2003), “meaningful
review of the INS’s removability determination is not precluded by the brevity of
the BIA’s summary affirmance decision because an appellate court will continue
to have the IJ’s decision and the record upon which it is based available for
review.” Id. at 1289 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Dia v. Ashcroft,
353 F.3d 228, 244 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that BIA summary affirmances “do not
force us to venture ‘through the looking glass’ (like Alice in Wonderland),
because we have the IJ’s reasoning and the record necessary to exercise our
function of review”); Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 845, 851 (9th Cir.
2003) (holding that BIA’s failure to issue an opinion does not compromise due
process when the court of appeals can “review the IJ’s decision directly”);
Georgis v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 962, 967 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Since we review directly
the decision of the IJ when a case comes to use from [a BIA summary affirmance
pursuant to the streamlining regulations], our ability to conduct a full and fair
appraisal of the petitioner’s case is not compromised, and the petitioner’s due
process rights are not violated.”). Like the Third Circuit, “[w]e are unaware of
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affirms without opinion, the immigration judge’s decision
becomes the final agency determination.323 The court of appeals
reviews the reasoning in the immigration judge’s decision, not the
BIA’s unwritten reasoning.324 As a result, circuit judges began
reading masses of transcripts of proceedings conducted by
immigration judges that were inadequately or illogically
reasoned.325 In many cases, the review concluded that the
immigration judges’ reasoning was incoherent, indecipherable, or
not supported by the record.326 Circuit judges around the nation
any requirement, let alone any constitutional requirement, that an agency
adjudicator must commit to writing or otherwise verbalize his or her reasoning,
where, as here, the agency has directed us to an opinion for review.” Dia, 353
F.3d at 240.
323. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4)(ii) (2007) (“If the Board member determines
that the decision should be affirmed without opinion, the Board shall issue an
order that reads as follows: ‘The Board affirms, without opinion, the result of
the decision below. The decision below is, therefore, the final agency
determination.’”); see also Falcon Carriche, 350 F.3d at 855 (“If the BIA
streamlines a case, the IJ’s decision becomes the final agency decision, and the
regulatory scheme gives us a green light to scrutinize the IJ’s decision as we
would a decision by the BIA itself.”).
324. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4)(ii) (providing that when the BIA affirms a
decision without opinion, the IJ’s decision is the final agency determination).
But when the BIA summarily affirms a decision entirely on grounds that the
circuit court does not have jurisdiction to review under Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) and the REAL ID Act, the
BIA affirmance will be the final ruling. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation
and the War on Independence, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 369, 382–83 (2006)
(discussing that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) restricts circuit court’s judicial review).
325. See Lindsey R. Vaala, Note, Bias on the Bench: Raising the Bar for the
U.S. Immigration Judges to Ensure Equality for Asylum Seekers, 49 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1012, 1023–27 (2007) (describing the circuit courts’ frustration
and irritation with increased burdens placed on their own courts as a result of
poor decision making at the BIA and immigration courts).
326. The reviewing circuit court is not foreclosed from reviewing the triallevel IJ’s decision. See Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 845, 855 (9th Cir.
2003) (“If the BIA streamlines a case, the IJ’s decision becomes the final agency
decision, and the regulatory scheme gives us a green light to scrutinize the IJ’s
decision as we would a decision by the BIA itself.”); Rusev v. Gonzales, 123 F.
App’x 316, 317 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Because the BIA streamlined and affirmed the
IJ’s decision without opinion, we review the decision of the IJ.”). As the
regulation clearly provides, it is the reasoning in the IJ’s decision that should be
reviewed, and not the BIA’s unwritten reasoning. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4)(ii)
(2014) (providing that the BIA may affirm the IJ’s decision without opinion and
thus, the IJ’s decision becomes final agency determination). When the BIA has
summarily affirmed IJs’ decisions that were based on reasoning that was
incoherent, indecipherable, or not supported by the record, the circuit courts
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have criticized immigration courts’ handling of cases, in
particular asylum petitions.327 Judge Posner of the Seventh
Circuit has been particularly vocal in denouncing the inadequacy
of the reason-giving taking place in immigration courts.328 In one
case, he noted that “there is no reasoned basis for the
immigration judge’s conclusion, which was based . . . on
unsubstantiated conjectures.”329 In another, he complained that
“the immigration judge’s opinion cannot be regarded as
reasoned; and there was no opinion by the Board of Immigration
Appeals.”330
During the early years of the immigration caseload surge, the
federal circuits refined their reason-giving doctrine so as to
monitor immigration judges’ decisions more tightly.331 Given the
BIA’s extended use of summary procedures, the circuits seemed
determined to ensure that at least at the trial level respondents
would obtain some form of reasoned decision.332 The Ninth
have readily remanded for clarification or rehearing. See You Hao Yang v. Bd. of
Immigration Appeals, 440 F.3d 72, 73, 76 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding the IJ’s
reasoning contained errors and remanding the case to the BIA for
reconsideration).
327. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Courts Criticize Judges’ Handling on Asylum
Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2005, at A1 (discussing that circuit court judges
have criticized IJs’ “pattern of biased and incoherent decisions in asylum
cases”).
328. See Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005)
(“[A]djudication of these cases at the administrative level has fallen below the
minimum standards of legal justice.”); accord Guchshenkov v. Ashcroft, 366
F.3d 554, 556, 560 (7th Cir. 2004) (referencing “continuing difficulty that the
board and the immigration judges are having in giving reasoned explanations
for their decisions to deny asylum” and “systematic failure by the judicial
officers of the immigration service to provide reasoned analysis for the denial of
applications for asylum”).
329. Hor v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Joshi v.
Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 732, 736–37 (7th Cir. 2004) (“A decision that resolves a
critical factual question without mention of the principal evidence cannot be
considered adequately reasoned.”).
330. Iao v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 530, 533 (7th Cir. 2005).
331. See Stacy Caplow, After the Flood: The Legacy of the “Surge” of Federal
Immigration Appeals, 7 Nw. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 26–28 (2012) (recounting how
federal judges became “increasingly vocal about the poor quality of immigration
adjudication”).
332. See Adam B. Cox, Deference, Delegation, and Immigration Law, 74 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1671, 1679–82 (2007) (noting that many judges like Judge Posner
are criticizing the competency of immigration judges).
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Circuit333 and the Second Circuit,334 which are the two courts
most affected by the surge, have been particularly active in
articulating a reason-giving requirement.335 Notwithstanding the
numerous and complex standards of review that apply to various
components of an immigration judge’s decision,336 the circuits
333. The Ninth Circuit has the largest immigration docket. See JOHN D.
BATES, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2013 ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE DIRECTOR tbl.B-3 (2013), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/
JudicialBusiness/2013/appendices/B03Sep13.pdf (comparing the Ninth Circuit’s
number of BIA appeals in 2013 with the other circuit courts). Its administrative
appeals caseload grew from 1,063 in 2001 to a high of 6,583 in 2005, and then
declined to a still whooping 4,625 cases in 2008. See LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM,
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2004 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR 92 tbl.B-3 (2004), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/
JudicialBusiness/2004/appendices/b3.pdf (providing statistics from 2000 to
2004); JAMES C. DUFF, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2009
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 98 tbl.B-3 (2009), http://www.uscourts.gov/
Statistics/JudicialBusiness/JudicialBusiness.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/Judic
ialBusiness/2009/appendices/B03Sep09.pdf (providing statistics from 2005 to
2009). In 2008, appeals from BIA decisions in the Ninth Circuit amounted to
45% of all BIA appeals. See id. at 94 tbl.B-3, 98 tbl.B-3 (dividing 4,625 by
10,280, the total number of BIA appeals in 2008); see also Michael Corradini,
Note, The Role of the Circuit Courts in Refugee Adjudication: A Comparison of
the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 201, 202–03 (2008)
(discussing the surge of immigration cases in circuit courts after 2002 and
providing statistics).
334. The Second Circuit has the country’s second-highest immigration
docket after the Ninth Circuit. See BATES, supra note 333, at tbl.B-3 (comparing
the Second Circuit’s number of BIA appeals in 2013 with the other circuit
courts). The immigration caseload of the Second Circuit amounts to 21.6% of all
appeals from the BIA. See DUFF, supra note 175, at 94–95 tbl.B-3 (dividing
1,624 by 7,518, the total number of BIA appeals from October 2008 to
September 2009); see also Tom Perrotta, Immigration Appeals Surge in Second
Circuit, 231 N.Y. L.J. 17, 17 (2004) (discussing the reasons for the immigration
surge and measures the Second Circuit is taking to keep pace with the appeals);
Mark Hamblett, Circuit Struggles to Cope with Upsurge in Asylum Appeals, 234
N.Y. L.J. 17, 17 (2005) (discussing the continued backlog of immigration appeals
in the Second Circuit); Jon O. Newman, The Second Circuit’s Expedited
Adjudication of Asylum Cases: A Case Study of a Judicial Response to an
Unprecedented Problem of Case Management, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 429, 429 (2009)
(noting that “[t]he flood of asylum claims that came to the Second Circuit from
2002 through 2004 presented an unprecedented challenge of case
management”).
335. Of course, other circuits have also contributed to this reason-giving
doctrine. See, e.g., Zewdie v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 804, 807 (8th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he
immigration judge failed to articulate a reasoned analysis based on the recorded
evidence for denying [the petitioner’s] claims.”).
336. “Questions of law and the application of law to undisputed fact are
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have clearly developed a requirement for them to explain their
determinations.337 In doing so, federal appeals judges have
striven to foster at least some of the democratic values of reasongiving discussed in Part I, in particular accuracy and
accountability.
The immigration reason-giving requirement has been
articulated with a view to enhancing accuracy in adjudicating
claims. Federal circuits are very deferential in reviewing an
immigration judge’s credibility determination, but they will
readily remand for clarification or rehearing338 if it is based on
flawed reasoning, faulty fact-finding, or impermissible
speculation.339 The substantial evidence standard340 requires that
the immigration judge’s factual findings be supported by
“reasonable, substantial and probative evidence in the record.”341
Additionally, an immigration judge must support adverse
credibility findings with “specific[,] cogent reasons.”342 In other
reviewed de novo.” Hu v. Holder, 579 F.3d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Bah v.
Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 110 (2d Cir. 2008)). The factual findings of the IJ and
BIA are reviewed under the “substantial evidence” standard, which treats them
as “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude
to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4) (2012); see also Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d
99, 110 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting § 1252(b)(4)).
337. A Westlaw search under Key # k24k575 “Findings or statement of
reasons” returned 966 federal circuits’ opinions and headnotes (as of March 1,
2015) discussing the sufficiency of IJs’ reasons.
338. See You Hao Yang v. Bd. of Immigration Appeals, 440 F.3d 72, 76 (2d
Cir. 2009) (remanding to the BIA because the IJ’s reasoning was unsupported
by substantial evidence on the record).
339. See Hu v. Holder, 579 F.3d 155, 158 (2d. Cir. 2009) (remanding because
the IJ’s determination was based “on a flawed fact-finding process,
impermissible speculation, and flawed reasoning”); see also Manzur v. U.S.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 494 F.3d 281, 289 (2d Cir. 2007) (providing that the
court has authority to remand cases if the IJ’s decision has “flawed reasoning, a
sufficiently flawed fact-finding process, or the application of improper legal
standards”); Cao He Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 428 F.3d 391, 400 (2d Cir.
2005) (discussing that the court will defer to an IJ’s factual findings unless the
findings are not supported by substantial evidence).
340. The substantial evidence standard was articulated by the Supreme
Court in I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481–84 (1992) (holding that
“[t]he BIA’s determination that Elias-Zacarias was not eligible for asylum must
be upheld if ‘supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on
the record considered as a whole’” (citation omitted)).
341. Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 116 (2d Cir. 2006)
(quoting Islami v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 391, 396 (2d Cir. 2005)).
342. Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 276 (3d Cir. 2002); see also Secaida-
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words, the reviewing court will check whether the immigration
judge’s reasons for reaching a particular outcome are consistent
with the evidence on the record.343 If a court of appeals is not
satisfied with the immigration judge’s reasons, it will reverse or
remand.344
Immigration judges must identify reasons specific enough to
permit review of whether they correctly applied the law.345 The
avowed goal for the requirement is not a participatory or a
legitimizing one.346 When mandating reasons, the federal circuits
are not primarily concerned with whether or not immigration
courts appear legitimate in the eyes of respondents or the larger
public.347 Indeed, the immigration adjudication process is not a
model of transparency. The requirement can be satisfied by oral
decisions, which are heard only by those present in the courtroom
and later available in the record for federal courts to review.348
Rosales v. I.N.S., 331 F.3d 297, 307 (“When an IJ rejects an applicant’s
testimony, the IJ must provide ‘specific, cogent’ reasons for doing so.” (quoting
Aguilera-Cota v. I.N.S., 914 F.3d 1375, 1381 (9th Cir. 1990)).
343. See, e.g., Nagi El Moraghy v. Ashcroft, 331 F.3d 195, 205 (1st Cir. 2003)
(“[D]eference is not due where findings and conclusions are based on inferences
or presumptions that are not reasonably grounded in the record.” (quoting
Cordero-Trejo v. I.N.S., 40 F.3d 482, 487 (1st Cir. 1994)).
344. See, e.g., Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 251 (3d Cir. 2003) (deciding to
remand the case because the IJ’s determination “[did] not logically flow from the
facts she considered”).
345. See, e.g., Beskovic v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 223, 227 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding
that the IJ’s explanation of why an asylum seeker’s arrests and physical abuse
in Kosovo did not rise to the level of persecution was insufficient to allow
meaningful review of whether the judge correctly applied the standard for
assessing the claim of past persecution).
346. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (“[T]he agency must examine the relevant data and articulate
a satisfactory explanation for its action including a ‘rational connection between
the facts found and the choice made.’” (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v.
United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1952))).
347. See Dia, 353 F.3d at 249 (discussing that federal judges, when
reviewing an IJ’s determination, analyze whether the evidence supports what “a
reasonable mind would find adequate”).
348. While immigration courts’ hearings are usually open to the public, the
judges’ opinions, even when written, are not published. See OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
IMMIGRATION JUDGE, supra note 308, at 10 (noting that most hearings are open
to the public). Oral decisions are not transcribed, absent appeal. See id. at 63
(noting that hearings are recorded electronically and on appeal the hearing is
transcribed). Parties may obtain record copies of the oral proceedings upon
request, but the courts do not provide nonparties with copies of the records. See
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Immigration judges do not usually write opinions, but instead
orally dictate their decisions using a recording device.349 Most
often, they read their decisions at the conclusion of a removal
hearing.350 In rare cases when they determine that there is a
complex or novel issue of law at stake, they send respondents a
written decision in the mail or schedule a master calendar date
for the respondent to return for the decision.351
id. at 11–12 (noting that parties may receive a copy of the hearing from the
Immigration Court, but non-parties may not). To obtain an official record,
nonparties must file a request for information under FOIA. Id. at 12. A major
problem with this system is that transcripts are sometimes inaccurate or
incomplete. See Witjaksono v. Holder, 573 F.3d 968, 971 (10th Cir. 2009) (noting
that “[t]he fifty-seven page transcript in this case is replete with nearly two
hundred notations saying ‘indiscernible’”); see also Stacy Caplow, ReNorming
Immigration Court, 13 NEXUS 85, 96 (2008) (advocating in favor of making
written decisions by IJs available to the public).
349. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.36 (2014) (“The Immigration Court shall create and
control the Record of Proceeding.”). Section 1003.37(a) further provides
A decision of the Immigration Judge may be rendered orally or in
writing. If the decision is oral, it shall be stated by the Immigration
Judge in the presence of the parties and a memorandum
summarizing the oral decision shall be served on the parties. If the
decision is in writing, it shall be served on the parties by first class
mail to the most recent address contained in the Record of Proceeding
or by personal service.
See also OFFICE OF THE CHIEF IMMIGRATION JUDGE, supra note 308, at 81
(providing that an immigration judge may give an oral or written decision);
EOIR Training Materials for New Immigration Judges, TRAC,
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/211/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2015)
(providing educational materials used for training newly appointed immigration
judges) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Daniel Dowell &
Jack
H.
Weil,
Preparing
and
Delivering
Oral
Decisions
6–
8 (2008), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/211/include/III-11training_
course_delivering_oral_decisions.pdf
(providing
step-by-step
dictation
instructions and best practices); Sydenham B. Alexander III, A Political
Response to Crisis in the Immigration Courts, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 9 (2006)
(noting that immigration judges’ “decisions are not published, but are often oral
opinions recorded on tapes”).
350. The oral decision typically begins by summarizing the facts.
Immigration judges then read boilerplate language about the legal standards for
the relief sought, and finally analyze the facts in light of the law. The oral
decision itself usually consists in reading a selection of explanatory clauses
chosen from “Templates” prepared by the EOIR, which are available in an
online “Benchbook,” available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/benchbook/templ
ates/Generic%20Template.htm.
351. See Stuart L. Lustig et al., Inside the Judges’ Chambers: Narrative
Reponses from the National Association of Immigration Judges Stress and
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The reason-giving requirement is not intended to further the
value of participation either. Some form of participation,
however, is required in that immigration judges must address the
respondents’ argument.352 Minimal responsiveness is usually
deemed sufficient, though.353 Indeed, full and meaningful
participation would require that respondents really understand
what is happening in the proceedings.354 This would entail the
systematic presence of qualified interpreters355 at the hearing as
well as government-appointed
counsel356 for indigent
respondents. By many accounts, neither seems to be the case. 357
Burnout Survey, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 57, 65 (2008) (quoting an IJ complaining
that “[t]he cases require judges . . . to rule promptly at the end of the hearing in
the form of a lengthy, detailed[,] and extemporaneous oral decision with little or
no time to reflect or to deliberate”).
352. The Ninth Circuit, for example, clearly requires that IJs be somewhat
responsive to respondents’ arguments. See, e.g., Sagaydak v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d
1035, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that “IJs and the BIA are not free to ignore
arguments raised by [a party]”).
353. See Almaghzar v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2006)
(explaining that individualized consideration does not require an IJ to discuss
every piece of evidence, and accepting the IJ’s general statement that he
considered all the evidence before him).
354. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and Adjudication:
Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1653–54 (2010)
(providing that in immigration proceedings many aliens do not speak English
and thus require the use of a translator); id. at 1655 (discussing problems with
immigration proceedings, including difficulties with interpreters and
unprepared lawyers).
355. Respondents are entitled to interpretation services at the government’s
expense in all immigration court hearings. See NAT’L LANGUAGE ACCESS
ADVOCATES NETWORK, LANGUAGE ACCESS PROBLEMS IN IMMIGRATION COURT 1
(2010), http://brennan.3cdn.net/5c3459d5d38a1553e3_e3m6bxf8z.pdf (explaining
that the Department of Justice has required federal agencies to make their
services accessible to non-English speakers, pursuant to Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and Executive Order 13166).
356. Because immigration deportation proceedings are not considered
criminal in nature, noncitizens have no right to have counsel provided. See
Ogbemudia v. I.N.S., 988 F.2d 595, 598 (5th Cir. 1993) (“[A]n alien does not
have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel in an immigration proceeding.”). They
only have the right to be represented at no cost to the government. See
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2012); see also RAMJINOGALES, JAYA ET AL., REFUGEE ROULETTE: DISPARITIES IN ASYLUM ADJUDICATION
AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 92 (2009) (showing that represented asylum clients
are more than three times likely to win their cases in immigration court).
357. See, e.g., IMMIGRATION COURT OBSERVATION PROJECT OF THE NAT’L
LAWYERS GUILD, FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS: A REPORT ON THE DUE PROCESS CRISIS
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Due to their meager financial resources, respondents are often
unrepresented or poorly represented.358 They have no
constitutional right to government-appointed counsel,359 but they
do have a statutory right to counsel.360
Immigration thus presents us with an illustration of how a
rather minimal, yet affirmative reason-giving requirement may
work in practice. Here, the adjudicators’ duty is restricted to
giving oral reasons for their decisions. If the requirement does
not fully vindicate the values of participation and transparency, it
does at least provide for a workable accountability mechanism in
addition to promoting accuracy.
2. Context 2: Sentencing
District judges are subject to a reason-giving requirement in
the sentencing context, enforced by the federal courts of
appeals.361 Moreover, since United States v. Booker362 and its
progeny,363 district judges “must adequately explain the chosen
NEW YORK CITY IMMIGRATION COURTS 11 (2011), http://nycicop.files.wordpress.
com/2011/05/icop-report-5-10-2011.pdf
(pointing
out
that
“[i]n
most
jurisdictions, . . . including New York, immigration court interpreters render
only those statements made by and directed to respondents”).
358. See Nina Bernstein, In the City of Lawyers, Many Immigrants Fighting
Deportation Do It Alone, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2009, at A21 (discussing that
many corporate firms in New York have cut back on pro bono work and other
reasons for the lack of lawyers willing to represent immigrants); see also Robert
A. Katzmann, The Legal Profession and the Unmet Needs of the Immigrant Poor,
21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 3, 10 (2008) (noting the wide disparity in the quality of
representation in immigration appeals).
359. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2012) (providing that an alien has the
privilege of representation, but at his own expense, not at the government’s
expense); Compean, 24 I. & N. Dec. 710, 714 (Dep’t of Justice 2009) (holding
that noncitizens have no “constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel
in removal proceedings”), vacated, 25 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2 (Dep’t of Justice 2009)
(vacating Compean, but declining to reach the constitutional issues).
360. The right to counsel is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2012). See
Hernandez-Gil v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 803, 808 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he statutory
right to counsel exists so that an alien has a competent advocate acting on his or
her behalf at removal proceedings.”).
361. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2012) (requiring the court to provide reasons
for its particular sentencing).
362. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
363. After Booker, it was unclear how reasonableness review would work in
IN
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sentence to allow for a meaningful appellate review and to
promote the perception of fair sentencing.”364 Booker empowered
district courts with greater discretionary authority to impose
individualized, policy-based sentences based on the specific
features presented by a particular case.365 Specifically, Booker
rendered the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Guidelines (the
Guidelines) advisory rather than mandatory and their application
subject to review for reasonableness.366 This greater discretion
came at a price: the imposition of a reason-giving requirement for
sentencing decisions, also known as the “reasonableness review”
standard for the appellate review of sentencing decisions.367
practice. But the Court explained how lower courts should implement its
holding in three other cases: Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 350–51 (2007);
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46–51 (2007); and Kimbrough v. United
States, 552 U.S. 85, 113 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring).
364. Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. A number of circuits, however, have adopted a
presumption of reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentences. See, e.g., United
States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 457 (4th Cir. 2006) (agreeing “with the Seventh
Circuit that a sentence imposed ‘within the properly calculated Guidelines
range . . . is presumptively reasonable.’” (quoting United States v. Newsom, 428
F.3d 685, 687 (7th Cir. 2005))); United States v. Alonzo, 435 F.3d 551, 554 (5th
Cir. 2006) (“[A] sentence within a properly calculated Guideline range is
presumptively reasonable.”); United States v. Williams, 436 F.3d 706, 708 (6th
Cir. 2006) (“We now join several sister circuits in crediting sentences properly
calculated under the Guidelines with a rebuttable presumption of
reasonableness.”); United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1054 (10th Cir. 2006)
(“[A] sentence that is properly calculated under the Guidelines is entitled to a
rebuttable presumption of reasonableness.”); United States v. Mykytiuk, 415
F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[A]ny sentence that is properly calculated under
the Guidelines is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness.”);
United States v. Tobacco, 428 F.3d 1148, 1151 (8th Cir. 2005) (“When a
defendant’s sentence is within the guidelines range it is presumptively
reasonable.”).
365. See John L. Kane, From the Bench, Sentencing: Beyond the Calculus, 37
LITIG. 3, 5 (2010) (pointing out that “[s]entencing . . . is in its essence
subjective. . . . It is not possible to determine a condign sentence without looking
closely at all relevant facts and circumstances, and making a nuanced
decision”).
366. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 245 (finding “the federal sentencing statute
that makes the Guidelines mandatory . . . incompatible with today’s
constitutional holding”).
367. See id. at 261, 268 (discussing that circuit courts must review a
sentence to determine whether it is reasonable or unreasonable); see also United
States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 116 (2d Cir. 2005) (instructing that “[d]istrict
judges will, of course, appreciate that whatever they say or write in explaining
their reasons for electing to impose a Guidelines sentence or for deciding to
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In reviewing sentences for reasonableness, the Supreme
Court requires that appellate courts look both to procedural
reasonableness and substantive reasonableness.368 Procedural
reasonableness considers the procedure the district court followed
in arriving at the sentence, e.g., it must have properly calculated
the Guidelines range, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
factors,369 and adequately explained the chosen sentence.370 Next,
the appellate court must consider the substantive reasonableness
of the sentence under an abuse-of-discretion standard.371
The new reason-giving requirement is imposed through
procedural reasonableness review.372 Circuits require that the
sentencing judges make their reasoning clear in either the trial
transcript or an official sentencing statement.373 Failure to give
an adequate explanation for the sentence may amount to a
procedural defect, which could lead to remand, reversal, or
both.374 Procedural reasonableness review focuses not on the
impose a non-Guidelines sentence will significantly aid this Court in performing
its duty to review the sentence for reasonableness”).
368. See Sigmund G. Popko, Throwing the Book at Sentencing Appeals:
Reasonableness and the Booker Decision, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 483, 504 (2006)
(discussing the “two-faceted analysis” that emerged in reasonableness analysis
after Booker).
369. These factors include advisory Guidelines range and relevant policy
statements, along with the nature and circumstances of the offense, history, and
characteristics of the offender, seriousness of the offense, promotion of respect
for the law, providing just punishment, affording adequate deterrence,
protecting the public, providing appropriate training or treatment, the kinds of
sentences available, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and
the need to provide restitution. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).
370. See Popko, supra note 368, at 504 (“[C]ourts examine the procedural
method by which the trial court arrived at the sentence.”).
371. See id. at 508 (noting that Booker requires reasonableness in light of
§ 3553(a) factors and this subjective standard and “[a]t least two circuit court
decisions have equated reasonableness with an abuse of discretion-type
standard”).
372. Gall specifically recognizes “failing to adequately explain the chosen
sentence” constitutes “significant procedural error.” Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
373. See id. at 50 (providing that a district court “must adequately explain
the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review”).
374. See, e.g., United States v. Friedman, 554 F.3d 1301, 1308 n.10 (10th
Cir. 2009) (reversing a non-Guideline, downward variance sentence, noting “the
undeniably sparse record in this case certainly bears on the question whether
Friedman’s sentence is substantively reasonable”). “To compound matters, the
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terms imposed, but on the reasons given for imposing them. 375
The idea is that those reasons must comport with Congress’s
sentencing priorities.376
Just like the immigration requirement, the sentencing
reason-giving requirement is primarily geared toward
accountability. Despite the subjectivity of sentencing decisions,
district courts must clearly explain the reasoning for their
sentencing decisions to enable appellate courts to conduct the
proper type of review.377 The problem to which the requirement
was meant to be an answer is the following: how can we allow
district courts some discretion in sentencing while at the same
time ensuring accountability? In Rita v. United States,378 the
Supreme Court clarified that the new standard of review in the
advisory-Guidelines era would be abuse of discretion, replacing
the de novo review standard for non-Guidelines sentences in the
pre-Booker era.379 Deference to a sentencing determination,
however, requires that the appellate court understand the basis
for that determination.380 In Gall v. United States,381 the Court
district court did not undertake to explain, in even a limited fashion, why [the
Guidelines were not followed.]” Id. The circuit court lamented that its
substantive reasonableness review must be conducted “against the backdrop of
an exceedingly limited record and an almost complete absence of explanation on
the part of the district court.” Id. On four different occasions, the panel stressed
that “there is simply nothing in the record” to support the sentencing judge’s
decision. Id. at 1308 n.11; see also United States v. Juwa, 508 F.3d 694, 700 (2d
Cir. 2007) (finding that the district court relied on unsubstantiated facts in
imposing sentence, a legal error that rendered the sentence procedurally
unreasonable); FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 (requiring a presentence report).
375. See United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 559, 563 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding
that the lack of a reasoned explanation made Johnson’s sentence procedurally
unreasonable, regardless of the sentence’s substantive length).
376. Eric Citron, Comment, United States v. Pho: Reasons and
Reasonableness in Post-Booker Appellate Review, 115 YALE L.J. 2183, 2184 (2006).
377. See, e.g., United States v. Figaro, 273 F. App’x 161, 163–64 (3d Cir. 2008)
(“It is therefore vital that the district court ‘state adequate reasons for a sentence
on the record so that this court can engage in meaningful appellate review.’”
(quoting United States v. King, 454 F.3d 187, 196–97 (3d Cir. 2006))).
378. 551 U.S. 338 (2007).
379. See id. at 361–65 (discussing Booker’s reasonableness review standard
and discussing pre-Booker cases).
380. See United States v. Cirilo-Muhoz, 504 F.3d 106, 132 (1st Cir. 2007) (“In
short, [appellate courts] cannot do [their] job of appellate review if [they] must
guess at the reasons underlying the district court’s sentence.”).
381. 552 U.S. 38 (2007).
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thus emphasized that an appellate court must clearly
demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion based on
the sentencing judge’s reasoned decision.382 The Court recognized
that the thoroughness of the explanation required depends on the
circumstances and noted that a brief explanation would suffice
even when the defendant or the government put forth
“nonfrivolous reasons” for imposing a non-Guidelines sentence.383
“[W]e cannot read the statute (or our precedent) as insisting upon
a full opinion in every case.”384 Nonetheless, “[w]here the
defendant or prosecutor presents nonfrivolous reasons for
imposing a different sentence . . . the judge will normally go
further and explain why he has rejected those arguments.”385
In contrast to the immigration context, the sentencing
reason-giving requirement also aims to effectively protect other
democratic values, in particular transparency and participation.
The Court has emphasized that the requirement serves a
valuable information-forcing purpose.386 Transparency in
sentencing greatly increases congressional and judicial
382. See id. at 40 (holding that “courts of appeals must review all
sentences . . . under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard”). The Second
Circuit gave a detailed explanation for the standard:
[F]or our own purposes, an adequate explanation is a precondition for
“meaningful appellate review.” We cannot uphold a discretionary
decision unless we have confidence that the district court exercised its
discretion and did so on the basis of reasons that survive our limited
review. Without a sufficient explanation of how the court below
reached the result it did, appellate review of the reasonableness of
that judgment may well be impossible.
United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 193 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal citation
omitted).
383. See Rita, 551 U.S. at 357 (“Sometimes the circumstances will call for a
brief explanation; sometimes they will call for a lengthier explanation. Where
the judge imposes a sentence outside the Guidelines, the judge will explain why
he has done so.”).
384. Id. at 356.
385. Id. at 357.
386. See id. at 356 (“Judicial decisions are reasoned decisions. Confidence in
a judge’s use of reason underlies the public’s trust in the judicial institution. A
public statement of those reasons helps provide the public with the assurance
that creates that trust.”); see also United States v. Blackie, 458 F.3d 395, 403
(6th Cir. 2008) (emphasizing that articulating reasons for a sentence “is
important not only for the defendant, but also for the public to learn why the
defendant received a particular sentence”) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
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understanding of the reasons for variation in sentencing.387 Such
transparency remains necessary to “dispel concerns that
sentences vary arbitrarily among judges, or that irrelevant
factors, such as race or ethnicity, significantly affect
sentences.”388 Moreover, transparency “facilitate[s] debate and
evaluation of the merits of particular policies” as well as assists
in the anticipation of the effects of changes in sentencing
policy.389 Perhaps more importantly, transparency “reduces the
possibility of surprise and confusion regarding the reasons for the
sentence ultimately imposed.”390 This increased transparency, in
turn, helps appellate courts determine whether a sentence is
substantively reasonable.391 Reason-giving thus serves an
accuracy-enhancing
purpose
in
sentencing.
Procedural
reasonableness is a tool to promote substantial reasonableness.392
The sentencing reason-giving requirement also gestures
toward participation. While the Court left the quantity of stated
reasons to a sentencing judge’s discretion, it did at least require
that district courts give enough reasons “to satisfy the appellate
court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a
reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking
387. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES
SENTENCING: AN ASSESSMENT OF HOW WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM 137 (2004),
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/researchprojects-and-surveys/miscellaneous/15-year-study/15_year_study_full.pdf
(discussing the advantages of the Guidelines).
388. Id. at xi.
389. Id. at 137.
390. Id. at 12.
391. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007) (“After settling on the
appropriate sentence, [the district court] must adequately explain the chosen
sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception
of fair sentencing.”).
392. The Second Circuit thus noted that the procedural requirement that a
district court state the reasons for a defendant’s sentence enables more accurate
substantive review of that sentence. See United States v. Rattoballi, 452 F.3d
127, 135 (2d Cir. 2006)
Indeed, a district court may be able to justify a marginal sentence by
including a compelling statement of reasons that reflect consideration
of § 3553(a) and set forth why it was desirable to deviate from the
Guidelines. In the absence of such a compelling statement, we may be
forced to vacate a marginal sentence where the record is insufficient,
on its own, to support the sentence as reasonable.
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authority.”393 This directive, however, is vague and leaves it up to
the circuit courts to determine the level of responsiveness
required.394 As Judge Posner has declared, “a sentencing judge
has no more duty than we appellate judges do to discuss every
argument made by a litigant; arguments clearly without merit
can, and for the sake of judicial economy should, be passed over
in silence.”395 The Supreme Court indicated that a district judge
may need to give a more robust explanation if “a party contests
the Guidelines sentence generally under § 3553(a)—that is,
argues that the Guidelines reflect an unsound judgment, or, for
example, that they do not generally treat certain defendant
characteristics in the proper way—or argues for departure.”396 At
the same time, the Supreme Court made clear that there is no
duty for judges to address the argument expressly. Implicit
reasoning may suffice when an explanation can be inferred from
the record.397
The sentencing context illustrates the functioning of a more
searching reason-giving requirement than in the immigration
context. Despite variations among circuits over the level of
specificity required from the district courts in explaining
sentences,398 they all require a written record of the
393. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007) (citing United States v.
Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 336–37 (1988)).
394. See id. (“The appropriateness of brevity or length, conciseness or detail,
when to write, what to say, depends upon circumstances.”).
395. United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673, 678 (7th Cir. 2005).
396. Rita, 551 U.S. at 358.
397. See id. at 358–59 (acknowledging that a judge might have said more to
explain a decision, but that such explanation was not required); id. at 356
[W]e cannot read the statute (or our precedent) as insisting upon a
full opinion in every case. The appropriateness of brevity or length,
conciseness or detail, when to write, what to say, depends upon
circumstances. Sometimes a judicial opinion responds to every
argument; sometimes it does not; sometimes a judge simply writes
the word “granted,” or “denied” on the face of a motion while relying
upon context and the parties’ prior arguments to make the reasons
clear. The law leaves much, in this respect, to the judge’s own
professional judgment.
398. See Sherod Thaxton, Determining “Reasonableness” Without a Reason?
Federal Appellate Review Post-Rita v. United States, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1885,
1898 (2008) (arguing that appellate court rulings fall along a spectrum: some
requiring very little, if any, explanation of sentencing determinations and others
requiring thoroughly reasoned and fact-specific sentencing opinions).
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reasons.399 In sentencing, the requirement has more ambitious
democratic aims, as it purports to protect defendants’
participation, as well as promoting accuracy in decision making
and judicial accountability.400
It is no coincidence that the federal courts impose a reasongiving requirement in the immigration and sentencing contexts.
Deportation and incarceration are the most serious sanctions the
law may impose.401 These extraordinary deprivations of liberty
stand out as perhaps the most significant decision a judge can
make.402 When judges make decisions of such dramatic and direct
personal consequence, it appears from the preceding analysis,
that they are more willing to put aside the efficiency, cognitive
and institutional justifications for not giving reasons.403 These
399. According to a number of academic commentators, sentencing judges
actually obey the reason-giving requirement. See, e.g., Sarah M.R. Cravens,
Judging Discretion: Contexts for Understanding the Role of Judgment, 64 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 947, 965 (2010)
[B]oth district and circuit courts usually get it right in practice,
whether their language about what they are doing gets it right or not.
The reasoning is generally sufficiently supported in the district court
record, either on the transcript or in written reasoning of the
sentencing court, so that it is apparent that all the requisite hoops
were jumped through—that the judge considered the presentence
report, heard arguments from parties, and gave reasons for the
sentence based on legitimate considerations under the statute.
400. See Schauer, supra note 61, at 65 (discussing policy arguments for and
against reason-giving requirements).
401. The U.S. Supreme Court has called the effect of deportation to be the
equivalent of banishment, a sentence to life in exile, loss of property, or all that
makes life worth living; in essence, deportation is a “punishment of the most
drastic kind.” Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948); see also Jordan v.
De George, 341 U.S. 223, 231 (1951) (noting the “grave nature of deportation”);
Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) (“To deport one who so claims to
be a citizen, obviously deprives him of liberty . . . . It may result also in loss of
both property and life; or of all that makes life worth living.” (citation omitted));
Lehmann v. United States ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685, 691 (1957) (Black, J.,
concurring) (“To banish them from home, family, and adopted country is
punishment of the most drastic kind.”); I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,
449 (1987) (“Deportation is always a harsh measure.”); Padilla-Agustin v. INS,
21 F.3d 970, 978 (9th Cir. 1994) (“When an alien faces the threat of deportation
the stakes are high.”); Stuart L. Lustig et al., supra note 351, at 57–58
(“Perhaps the most disturbing stories of human suffering anywhere in the legal
system arise in asylum cases.”).
402. See cases cited supra note 401 (discussing the serious nature of
deportation).
403. See, e.g., Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 231 (1951) (“Despite the
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two case studies show that American federal judges, despite
enjoying by and large the constitutional and legislative freedom
to balance justifications for and against reason-giving, do not shy
away from enforcing reason-giving mandates on trial-level
adjudicators when they deem it warranted.
V. Civil Law Courts Require and Balance
In this final Part, I develop a comparative law example
showing that the judicial balancing approach to reason-giving,
which is typical of the Anglo-American judicial tradition, is more
widely shared than one might assume. A number of civil law
jurisdictions, especially in continental Europe, have apparently
embraced a wholly different methodology: in principle, the
drafters of the Constitution or the legislatures, not the judges,
are in charge of balancing the reasons for and against reasongiving.404 As a result, civil law judges are commonly either under
a constitutional or a statutory duty to give written reasons for all
cases decided on the merits.405 In practice, however, this Part
argues that despite this absolutist mandate, civil law judges
engage in balancing along the lines of their American
counterparts.406
A. Civil Law Theory: Affirmative Duty
The no-balancing approach has traditionally been the civil
law approach. This methodology originated in France, where all
judges are subject to a statutory reason-giving requirement and
must write opinions in all cases disposed of on the merits.407 The
fact that this is not a criminal statute, we shall nevertheless examine the
application of the vagueness doctrine to this case. We do this in view of the
grave nature of deportation.”).
404. See infra note 422 and accompanying text (discussing the emergence of
statutory reason-giving requirements in civil law jurisdictions in Europe).
405. See infra notes 417–421 and accompanying text (discussing the French
requirement to give reasons).
406. See infra note 432 and accompanying text (pointing out that the Cour
de cassation writes differently depending on the type of case).
407. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing French statutes
that require written opinions that include reasons for the decision).
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requirement can be traced back to the August 16–24, 1790
revolutionary statute on judicial organization, which imposed a
formal mandate on courts to provide reasons for their decisions.408
The reform was constructed on the principle—a corollary of
legislative sovereignty—that the arbitrary power of the Old
Regime courts (the “parlements”) must end.409 The prerevolutionary judiciary was perceived as a corrupt and
reactionary enemy of social reform.410 In the new regime,
legislation was to be the primary source of law and judges were
no longer to participate in the lawmaking function. They would
become the “mouthpiece of the law,” as Montesquieu had hoped
for.411 The revolutionaries endorsed legislative supremacy,
following Rousseau’s postulate that law is the expression of the
general will and can therefore be generated only by the elected
body, that is, by the legislature.412 In this view, enacting a
reason-giving requirement was thought of as the ideal tool to
monitor the judges of the young Republic.413 The mandate aimed
at subordinating judges to the legislature and preventing them
from making law by demanding that they systematically indicate
408. The August 16–24, 1790 Statute, Title V, art. 15 provides that a judicial
opinion must have four parts, the third of which must consist of “the reasons
that determined the judge” (“les motifs qui auront déterminé le juge”). See
JACQUELINE LUCIENNE LAFOND, LA RÉVOLUTION F RANÇAISE FACE AU SYSTÈME
J UDICIAIRE D ’A NCIEN RÉGIME (2001) (recounting the attitude of the French
revolutionaries toward the Old Regime judicial system).
409. See Bernard Beignier, Les Arrêts de Règlement, 9 DROITS 45 (1989)
(discussing the pre-revolutionary French courts and their tendencies to behave
like sovereign legislatures enacting rules of general application). See generally
ARLETTE L EBIGRE , LA J USTICE DU R OI : LA VIE J UDICIAIRE DANS L ’ANCIENNE
FRANCE (1988) (discussing the role of the law in the pre-revolutionary royal
regime in France).
410. See I SSER W OLLOCH, THE NEW REGIME : TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE
FRENCH CIVIC ORDER 1789–1820 297–320 (1994) (discussing the attitude of
French revolutionaries toward the Old Regime judicial system).
411. MONTESQUIEU , T HE SPIRIT O F THE LAWS Bk. XI, Ch. 6 (1748).
412. See J EAN J ACQUES R OUSSEAU, S OCIAL C ONTRACT Bk. II. (1762).
413. See Cohen, supra note 226, at 257, 261 n.11 (“This interpretation is
comforted by historical research on the emergence of a duty to give reasons in
French law.” (citing Tony Sauvel, Histoire du Jugement Motivé, 61 RDP 5
(1955)); Godding, supra note 20, at 65 (discussing the emergence of the reasongiving tradition for published decisions in France); Pascal Texier, Jalons pour
une histoire de la motivation des sentences, in LA MOTIVATION, ACTES DU
COLLOQUE LIMOGES, 1998, l’ASSOCIATION HENRI CAPITANT DES AMIS DE LA
CULTURE JURIDIQUE 5 (2000).
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which provision of the statute they applied in each particular
case.414
In practice, however, as Mitchell Lasser has shown, in an
ironic twist, over the past two hundred years or so, French judges
have deployed such a cryptic style of opinion writing that they
have perhaps been less constrained than their common law
colleagues.415 To this day, the French judicial opinion “is often
an uninformative syllogism of a few hundred words that purports
to deduce the holding from a code or statutory provision. French
opinions are neither reasoned nor candid.”416 They are famously
concise, lacking any developed findings of fact, almost never
referring to past judicial decisions, and containing little that
could be considered as serious interpretive or policy analysis.417
French judges do not exist as individual reason-givers. The fiction
is that they should express the view of “the Court,” a single,
unanimous unit.418 Concurrences and dissents are prohibited.419
Opinions are not presented as the work of individual judges, but
strictly adhere to a disembodied, objective tone, using the third
person singular—“In the name of the French people . . . the
Court decides.”
This structure, which in theory should have ensured that the
statutory law alone dictate the outcome of judicial controversies,
has led to the opposite result. French judges have no personal
responsibility for shaping the doctrine they produce and often
abstain from disclosing much information on the reasons that
414. See Michael Wells, French and American Judicial Opinions, 19 YALE J.
INT’L L. 81, 94 (1994) (discussing the formal requirements of French judicial
opinions).
415. See MITCHEL DE S.-O.-L’ E LASSER , J UDICIAL DELIBERATIONS : A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF J UDICIAL TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY 5 (2004)
(“In a paradoxical twist, French judges have . . . deployed a cryptic style of
opinion writing whose main purpose was to prove their dutiful submission but
which left them in fact more free.” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)).
416. Wells, supra note 414, at 84.
417. See id. at 104–06 (showing that the paradigmatic French judicial
opinion has survived unchanged since the Revolution).
418. See Wells, supra note 414, at 98 (“Anonymity and collegial
decisionmaking are regarded as necessary safeguards for judicial independence
and impartiality.”).
419. See id. (“French opinions contain no dissents or concurring
opinions . . . .”).
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persuaded them.420 As a result, the reason-giving requirement
fails to act as a check on judicial discretion.421 The Conseil d’État,
for example, France’s Supreme Court for administrative law, has
evolved as one of the country’s foremost lawmakers, resolutely
departing from the role ascribed to courts by the revolutionaries,
all the while maintaining the tradition of syllogistic opinions.422
Since the Second World War, one of the Conseil d’État’s boldest
moves has been to declare “general principles of law applicable
even in the absence of legislative provision.”423 These general
principles, which the Conseil d’État has used to review both
executive and legislative action, differ substantially one from the
other and have been developed outside of any systematic
doctrinal framework.424
The first such principle to be recognized was a due process
right to fair hearing in Dame Veuve Trompier-Gravier, which is
considered a landmark case in French law.425 Mrs. TrompierGravier was authorized by the prefecture to run a newsstand in
Paris.426 The prefect withdrew the authorization but refused to
explain why.427 The Conseil d’État reversed, not based on a
statutory provision, but on the ground that “not having been
given the opportunity to put forward her grounds of defense, the
420. See id. at 106 (stating that French opinions included no reasons at all
prior to the French Revolution, and that judicial opinions since the Revolution
have merely added a few clauses).
421. See id. at 107–08 (arguing that French courts have exercised broad
authority to make law since the Revolution in spite of the reason-giving
requirements intended to limit the courts).
422. See FRITS STROINK & EVELINE C.H.J. VAN DER LINDEN, J UDICIAL
LAWMAKING AND A DMINISTRATIVE LAW 108 (2005) (discussing the development
of the Conseil d’État).
423. Roland Drago, The General Principles of Law in the Jurisprudence of
the French Conseil d’État, 11 AM. U. L. R EV. 126, 126 (1962) (internal quotation
marks omitted). See generally Richard J. Cummins, The General Principles of
Law, Separation of Powers and Theories of Judicial Decision in France, 35 I NT ’L
& COMP . L.Q. 594 (1986) (discussing the increasing importance of general
principles in French courts’ decisions).
424. Some flow from constitutional principles, others stem from “the nature
or essence of a republican regime,” e.g., the principle of legality, or from the
“spirit of a text or a body of texts”; still others are said to be required by the rule
of law. See generally RENÉ C HAPUS , DROIT ADMINISTRATIF GÉNÉRAL (2001).
425. Dame Veuve Trompier-Gravier, CE Sect., May 5, 1944, Rec. Lebon 133.
426. Id.
427. Id.
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respondent is entitled to maintain that the challenged decision
has been taken by the Prefect of Seine in an irregular manner
and is thus ultra vires.”428 What is extraordinary about this
opinion is that in a mere 236 words,429 making no attempt to
justify its power to create law without relying on statutory
authority or to even suggest that there is a gap in the existing
statutes, and without ever referring explicitly to “general
principles,” the Conseil d’État is effectively declaring its
prerogative to create law overriding administrative regulations as
well as legislation.430 Think of a Marbury v. Madison431 opinion
that would never use the words: “power,” “Constitution,”
“constitutional,”
“unconstitutional,”
“legislature,”
“judicial
authority,” etc., and would provide no justification whatsoever for
428. Id.
429. Id. The opinion is so short that it can be quoted at full length:
Conseil d’Etat.
Having seen the summary application and the further particulars
filed on behalf of Madame the Widow Trompier-Gravier, born Tichy
(Marie Gabrielle) domiciled in Paris 14th arrondissement . . . asking
that it please the Conseil to annul a decision dated 26 December 1939
whereby the Prefect of Seine withdrew the license to occupy a
newspaper kiosk of which she was the holder;
Having seen the orders of the Prefect of Seine dated 13 March and 11
December 1924 and 22 January 1934; the Act of 18 December 1940;
Considering that it is settled that the challenged decision, whereby
the Prefect of Seine withdrew Madame Trompier-Gravier’s licence to
sell newspapers in a kiosk on Boulevard Saint-Denis, Paris, was
taken on the grounds of misconduct by the applicant;
Considering that, having regard to the nature of the withdrawal in
the circumstances mention and to the gravity of this sanction, such a
measure could not lawfully be taken without Madame TrompierGravier’s having been enabled to discuss the grievances mounted
against her; that the applicant, not having been given the opportunity
to put forward her grounds of defense, is entitled to maintain that the
challenged decision has been taken by the Prefect of Seine in an
irregular manner and is thus ultra vires; (Prefect’s decision
annulled).
430. A few months after the decision Trompier-Gravier, the Court finally
referred explicitly to the “general principles” in the case of Aramu, CE Ass., Oct.
26, 1945, Rec. 213, which held, in a post-war, purging case dealing with the
dismissal of a police officer implicated in the Vichy regime, that “it
follows . . . from general principles of law applicable even in the absence of a text
that a sanction cannot be lawfully pronounced when the respondent was not
given the opportunity to meaningfully defend himself.”
431. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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the newfound judicial authority to determine the constitutionality
of legislation.
To sum up, the French statutorily imposed reason-giving
requirement, rather than working as a compelling judicial
restraint mechanism effectively subordinating judges to
legislators, has arguably allowed courts to exercise great
discretion in making law. More fundamentally, though, it has
proved ineffective at mechanically revealing judges’ reasons for
deciding cases. In practice, much like common law judges, French
judges have had the liberty to balance the justifications for and
against reason-giving. They have developed their own judicial
methodologies to sort out cases they deem worthy of serious
reason-giving from those that are relegated to boilerplate
explanations.432
B. Civil Law Reality: De Facto Balancing
Initially, the French example seemed to suggest that the civil
law approach to reason-giving is fundamentally different from
the U.S. federal courts’ balancing approach in that it imposes the
writing of a formalized, unanimous opinion for all cases decided
on the merits while American judges can choose whether or not to
give reasons and in what form (be it a 100-page long published
opinion including several concurrences and dissents or an oral
explanation delivered from the bench).433 In practice, however,
the American and the civil law approaches are not so
inconsistent. De facto civil law judges, who are sensitive to the
never-ending tension between reason-giving and caseload
management, balance the reasons for and against reason-

432.

See, e.g., Christian Atias, Crise de la Motivation Judiciaire?, COUR DE
(May 17, 2005), http://www.courdecassation.fr/colloques_activites_
formation_4/2005_2033/intervention_m._atias_1_8108.html (last visited Jan. 17,
2015) (analyzing the reason-giving practices of the Cour de cassation and
pointing out that the court writes differently when it is engaging in dispute
resolution and when it is developing the law, “general and solemn phrases”
being reserved to the latter case) (on file with Washington and Lee Law
Review).
433. See infra note 447–448 and accompanying text (discussing the
discretionary jurisdiction and practices of the U.S. Supreme Court).
CASSATION
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giving.434 While there is a de jure right to reasons in jurisdictions
operating under a constitutional or a statutory reason-giving
requirement, that right does not always exist de facto.435
In light of growing dockets and other resource constraints,
civil law judges ration reason-giving. They engage in what
empirical legal scholars William Reynolds and William Richman
have called “de facto certiorari” in the context of the U.S. courts of
appeals.436 The idea of de facto certiorari describes the fact that
dramatic increases in caseloads have transformed the federal
courts of appeals into “certiorari courts” in the sense that they
use streamlined procedures doing away with oral arguments and
full-fledged opinions for a significant portion of their docket, all
the while deciding all properly presented appeals on the merits.437
According to Reynolds and Richman, despite being courts to
which appeals are formally as of right, for reason-giving
purposes, the courts of appeals often function as if they had
discretionary jurisdiction.438 They certainly decide all properly
presented appeals, but because of docket pressures, they can give
detailed reasons only in a subset of the cases they dispose of on
the merits.439
434. See infra notes 461–463 (arguing that the current practices of French
courts indicate that courts are in fact balancing reasons for and against reason
giving).
435. See supra note 430 and accompanying text (discussing how French
judges have rationed reason-giving).
436. William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The New Certiorari
Courts: Congress Must Expand the Number of Judges on the U.S. Courts of
Appeals to Restore Their Traditional Role, 80 J UDICATURE 206, 207 (1997)
(hereinafter Reynolds & Richman, The New Certiorari); see also William M.
Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari:
Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273, 281–82
(1996) (stating that the expectation of a fully reasoned, published opinion at the
appellate court level no longer exists).
437. See Reynolds & Richman, The New Certiorari, supra note 436, at 206
(stating that Article III appellate courts use traditional methods of oral
argument and fully reasoned opinions in less than half of their cases).
438. See id. (comparing the practices of certiorari courts with present
appellate court practices); John B. Oakley, Precedent in the Federal Courts of
Appeals: An Endangered or Invasive Species?, 8 J. APP . PRAC. & PROCESS 123,
127 (2006) (suggesting that “tracking and screening systems have instituted
what is, in effect, a gloss of discretionary appellate jurisdiction for the appeal as
of right to which federal litigants are statutorily entitled”).
439. See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 436, at 282 (“[P]ublished opinions
today account for less than a third of federal circuit terminations.”).
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Interestingly, something similar has happened in a number of
civil law courts, which operate under the dual constraint of
mandatory jurisdiction and the duty to write opinions for all cases
decided on the merits.440 Certain appeals receive more careful
consideration, while others are disposed of on the merits with
minimal reason-giving. For the former, the number and authority
of reason-givers may be greater than for the latter: some appeals
are decided by a three-member panel of judges or by an even larger
panel of judges, while others are resolved by a single judge, or
sometimes, effectively by court staff.441 Correspondingly, the
reason-giving may range from a carefully crafted, individualized
opinion to a two-sentence boilerplate opinion form.442 If it is true
that civil law judges also engage in this type of de facto certiorari,
then the interesting institutional design observation is the
following: whether or not drafters of the Constitution or legislators
attempt to preempt courts’ balancing the justifications for and
against reason-giving by imposing a blanket requirement, judges
nonetheless develop their own reason-giving methodologies to
reconcile caseload constraints and other goals of the judicial
process with the democratic values of reason-giving.
Let us compare two highly respected courts that epitomize to
some extent their respective legal traditions, the European Court
of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the U.S. Supreme Court. Despite
different respective institutional and cultural settings, these two
institutions are sufficiently similarly situated for the purposes of
comparing reason-giving. Although neither is a constitutional
court, the two courts are similar in that they engage in extensive
constitutional review based on a written instrument443 and have a
direct relationship with individuals (unlike a number of European
constitutional courts that individual litigants cannot petition
directly.)444 There are, however, major differences between the two
440. See infra note 449 and accompanying text (discussing the mandatory
duty to give reasons in French judicial opinions).
441. See infra note 456 and accompanying text (discussing the relatively
new practice of allowing a single judge to determine admissibility of cases).
442. See infra notes 459–464 and accompanying text (discussing methods of
resolving cases and completing opinions).
443. Respectively, the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the United States Constitution.
444. The ECtHR is one of Europe’s supranational courts, which hears
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institutions. While the ECtHR is a supranational court whose
reach now extends to close to 900 million people in forty-seven
countries, the U.S. Supreme Court is a national court.445 Moreover,
and most importantly for the purpose of the current argument, the
two courts are dissimilar in one key respect: while the ECtHR is
under a blanket reason-giving requirement and has mandatory
jurisdiction over all the meritorious petitions it receives,446 the
Supreme Court enjoys discretionary jurisdiction over its docket447
complaints that a contracting State has violated the fundamental rights
protected by the European Convention on Human Rights. See THE CONVENTION
FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, art. 34,
Sept. 21, 1970 (“The Court may receive applications from any
person . . . claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting
Parties.”); Steven Greer, Constitutionalizing Adjudication Under the European
Convention on Human Rights, 23 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 405, 405–07 (2003)
(describing the European Convention on Human Rights as a constitutional order
in the sphere of human rights); see also PETER VAN DIJK ET AL., THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 51 (4th ed. 2006)
(emphasizing the importance of individual access to the ECtHR).
445. The European Convention on Human Rights, an international treaty
created after the Second World War, has given rise to a system that has taken
on elements of a federal constitutional order. Though not a federation, the
Convention system is notable for its overlapping rights regimes: a supranational
level charter of rights, interpreted by the ECtHR, and vibrant rights protection
and articulation in the many states signatories to the Convention.
446. See EUR. CT . H.R., RULES OF C OURT
37–38 (2014),
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Rules_Court_ENG.pdf (spelling out the
writing and publication requirements for decisions and describing the
mandatory content of the ECtHR’s opinions). The court’s mandatory jurisdiction
has been significantly relaxed by Protocol 14, which entered in force in June of
2010. As amended, the Convention allows single judges to “declare inadmissible
or strike out of the Court’s list of cases an application.” Protocol No. 14 to the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
art. 27, June 4, 2010 (amending the control system of the Convention).
447. The U.S. Supreme Court has evolved from a Court of mandatory
jurisdiction to a Court of discretionary jurisdiction thanks to various acts passed
by Congress. The Judiciary Act of 1891, also known as Evarts Act, created the
U.S. courts of appeals, which resulted in an immediate reduction in the
Supreme Court’s workload (from 623 cases filed in 1890 to 379 in 1891) by
transferring most of the Court’s direct appeals to the newly created nine circuits
and by introducing the statutory writ of certiorari for the first time as a
mechanism to enable discretionary review and docket control. See Act of March
3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826. See generally DORIS PROVINE, CASE SELECTION IN
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1980). Most importantly, the Judiciary Act
of 1925 (also known as the “Judge Bill”) and the Supreme Court Case Selections
Act of 1988 finalized the transformation of the Court into a court of
discretionary jurisdiction. Judiciary Act of 1925, Pub. L. No. 68–415, 43 Stat.
936; Supreme Court Case Selections Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–352, 102 Stat.
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and almost always refrains from explaining its denials of
certiorari.448
The French revolutionary ideal permeates the ECtHR
reason-giving requirement: in theory, the European court is not
supposed to balance justifications for and against reasongiving.449 In recent years, however, the ECtHR has become a
victim of its own success. It faces a docket crisis of massive
proportions,450 the consequence of the increasing number of
member states subject to its jurisdiction, its favorable public
reputation, a distrust of domestic judiciaries in some member
states, and enduring human rights violations in others.451 As a
662. Today, the Court enjoys nearly unfettered discretion to choose which cases
to hear via the discretionary writ of certiorari.
448. See SUP. CT. R. 16.1. (providing that, after consideration of the papers
distributed on petition for certiorari, “the Court will enter an appropriate order,”
which “may be a summary disposition on the merits”); see also EUGENE
GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE: FOR PRACTICE IN THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 328 (9th ed. 2007) (“Most orders of the Court
denying petitions for writs of certiorari do no more than announce the simple
fact of denial, without giving any reasons therefor.”); Margaret Meriwether
Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari: Jurisprudential
Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 WASH. U. L.Q 389, 402
(2004) (pointing out that no explanation “is ever rendered for the Court’s
action,” and “no record of the Court’s vote is ever published (regardless of
whether the case is granted or denied)”).
449. This ideal is reflected in the ECtHR case law itself. Since 1994, the
ECtHR has held that the right to fair trial protected by Article 6 of the
Convention requires that “judgments of courts and tribunals should adequately
state the reasons on which they are based.” Hirvisaari v. Finland, App. No.
49684/99, 38 Eur. H.R. Rep. 7, para. 30 (2004); see also Ruiz Torija v. Spain,
App. No. 18390/91, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 553, para. 29 (1995); Higgins v. France,
App. No. 20124/92, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 703, para. 42 (1999) (considering reasongiving as critical to ensure effective access to justice and holding that judgments
lacking reasons are a violation of the right to fair trial).
450. As of December 31, 2013, there were 99,900 cases pending before the
European Court of Human Rights. Supra note 71 and accompanying text.
451. The caseload problem can be traced back to Protocol 11, entered into
force in 1998, which replaced the Commission and original structure of the
ECtHR with a permanent court. Prior to that reform, the Convention system
was based on a division of labor between the European Commission of Human
Rights and the ECtHR: the Commission decided on the admissibility of an
individual complaint, and reviewed the merits of the case in the first instance.
In most cases, the ECtHR would have the final merits determination. See Paul
Mahoney, New Challenges for the European Court of Human Rights Resulting
from the Expanding Case Load and Membership, 21 PENN ST . I NT ’L L. REV. 101,
101–02 (2003) (discussing the jurisdiction and case load of the European Court
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result, in 2013, the ECtHR issued 916 judgments,452 that is,
about twelve times more than the U.S. Supreme Court, which
handed down seventy-five opinions during the same time
frame.453
The peculiar institutional design of the ECtHR, together with
its bureaucratic culture,454 partly account for this contrast. First,
the ECtHR does not decide cases en banc with all of the fortyseven judges present.455 Instead, depending on the nature and
importance of the case, judges may sit alone or in “committees” of
three judges, “chambers” of seven judges, and a “Grand Chamber”
of seventeen judges.456 Second, ECtHR judges rely on an army of
bureaucrats, including about 270 full-time staff attorneys to write
opinions, using templates, databases of ready-made clauses, and
other shortcuts.457 These institutional differences, however,
should not be the end of our inquiry. There are latent similarities
between the European and American high courts’ judicial
practices.
Indeed, upon closer examination, it appears that the two
courts’ reason-giving practices are not so far apart. Granted,
during the 2013 Term, the Supreme Court issued seventy-five
of Human Rights).
452. EUR. CT . H.R. A NNUAL REPORT 197 (2014). It should be noted that the
ECtHR disposes of the bulk of its applications via “decisions,” rather than
“judgments.” Given the cursory and repetitive nature of decisions, I focus on
judgments for the purposes of comparison with U.S. opinions.
453. 2013 Term Opinions of the Court, SUPREME CT. OF THE U.S. (Jan. 18,
2015), http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/slipopinion/13 (last visited Jan.
19, 2015) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review).
454. See Andrew Tickell, Dismantling the Iron-Cage: The Discursive
Persistence and Legal Failure of a “Bureaucratic Rational” Construction of the
Admissibility Decision-Making of the European Court of Human Rights, 12 GER.
L.J. 1786, 1796–97 (2011) (pointing out the bureaucratic character of the
ECtHR, especially of its admission decision-making procedures).
455. Paul L. McKaskle, The European Court of Human Rights: What It Is,
How It Works, and Its Future, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 14–24 (2005) (discussing the
structure and practice of the ECtHR).
456. EUR. CT . H.R. RULE 1 (defining “Grand Chamber,” “Chamber,” and
Committee”). Since Protocol No. 14 came into force on June 1st, 2010, judges
sitting alone (“single-judge formation”) can now decide whether or not to admit
cases. EUR. CT . H.R. ANNUAL REPORT 2010 18, 79 (2011).
457. See McKaskle, supra note 455, at 27–31 (discussing the large staff of
the ECtHR and noting that “[e]xtensive use of a central legal staff may also
result in greater bureaucratic or institutional decision-making”).
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opinions while the ECtHR issued 916.458 But from a practical and
functional standpoint, the European judges did not author 916
lawmaking opinions.459 Only a small percentage of these 916
opinions are truly making law and of any jurisprudential
significance. Tellingly, in 2013, only about thirty opinions were
deemed by the court to be of high importance.460 These are
judgments the ECtHR considers to be making a significant
contribution to the development, clarification, or modification of
its case law, and, therefore, are worthy of reporting in its official
printed reports.461 Even more strikingly, the Grand Chamber,
which “deals with cases that raise a serious question of
interpretation or application of the Convention, or a serious issue
of general importance,”462 and is thus perhaps the U.S. Supreme
Court’s most plausible comparator at the European level,
authored only thirteen of that year’s 916 judgments—about
1.4%.463
These figures suggest that the ECtHR is in fact balancing
reasons for and against reason-giving. In contrast to the U.S.
Supreme Court, whose caseload has been diminishing in the past
years,464 the ECtHR does not have at its disposal the writ of
458. See infra note 464 and accompanying text (listing the number of
Supreme Court opinions produced each year).
459. See EUR. CT . H.R. A NNUAL REPORT 2013, at 73–75 (2014) (listing the
twenty-nine opinions selected for publication in the Reports of Judgments and
Decisions 2013 as well as the four additional opinions that the court reserves
the right to report).
460. See id. (listing only twenty-nine opinions as selected for publication out
of 913 total).
461. See id. (listing only the few opinions selected for publication).
462. EUR. CT . H.R. A NNUAL REPORT 2010, at 17 (2011).
463. EUR. CT . H.R. A NNUAL REPORT 2013, at 61 (2014).
464. The Justices decided ninety-two merits cases in total during the 2009
term compared to seventy-three during the 2013 term. The numbers for
previous Terms are 73 (OT13), 79 (OT12), 78 (OT11), 85 (OT10), 86 (OT09), 79
(OT08), 71 (OT07), 72 (OT06), 82 (OT05), 80 (OT04), 79 (OT03), 80 (OT02), 81
(OT01), 85 (OT00), and 77 (OT99). See Stat Pack Archive, SCOTUSBLOG
http://www.scotusblog.com/reference/stat-pack/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2015) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Erwin N. Griswold,
Rationing Justice—The Supreme Court’s Caseload and What the Court Does Not
Do, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 339–41 (1975) (arguing that the Court’s
discretionary cutting of its docket has become extreme); Arthur D. Hellman, The
Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 403, 410–12
(discussing the effect of mandatory jurisdiction repeal); Margaret Meriwether
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certiorari. But that has not prevented the European court from
disposing of a large proportion of its docket through procedural
terminations465 and from concentrating its attention on the small
share of cases it decides with an eye to making law, all the while
issuing boilerplate opinions or opinions entirely written by the
staff for the remaining cases of its reviews on the merits.466 In
other words, the ECtHR is partly operating as a certiorari court
in which reason-giving functions as an implicit filtering
mechanism.467 De facto, it selects the cases judges will decide by
giving meaningful reasons.
This comparison allows us to rethink the balancing of
reasons. Another way of thinking about the problem seems to be
the following: should courts decide more cases at the cost of
giving fewer reasons and reasons of lesser quality? Or should
Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Supreme Court’s Plenary Docket, 58 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 737, 751–58 (2001) (same); Philip Allen Lacovara, The Incredible
Shrinking Supreme Court: If Their Productivity Were Measured By Private
Sector Standards, the Supremes Might Receive Pink Slips, AM. LAWYER 53 (Dec.
2003) (listing problems with the policy of giving Supreme Court justices absolute
discretion over their docket).
465. See Tickell, supra note 454, at 1792–93 (critiquing the ECtHR’s failure
to clarify the criteria it uses for declaring cases admissible or not admissible).
466. For example, on February 28, 2002, the ECtHR issued a set of 133
nearly identical opinions (but for the name of the petitioners) in conjunction
with 133 judgments on alleged Article 6 violations by Italian courts—that is, on
the unreasonable delay in processing trials. Somewhat amusingly, even dissents
can be boilerplate: Italian judge Ferrari Bravo dissented on the entire set of
judgments using the same exact dissenting opinion. See, e.g., Maddalena
Palmieri v. Italy, App. No. 51023/99, Sec. 1, Eur. Ct. H.R., Feb. 28, 2002,
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-60222
(beginning the dissent with the following words of apology: “I regret for having
to dissociate myself from my colleagues in the 133 cases examined today, but I
believe that the measure is outrageous and one can no longer remain silent”)
(my translation).
467. This raises the question whether the opinions that the ECtHR did not
consider to be of “high importance” last year should have been issued at all
considering that the ECtHR increasingly sees its role as being primarily that of
a supranational constitutional court, rather than a super appellate court. See
Wojciech Sadurski, Constitutionalization of the European Court of Human
Rights, the Accession of Central and East European States to the Council of
Europe, and the Idea of Pilot Judgments, 9 HUM. RTS L. REV. 397, 397–401
(2009) (arguing that the ECtHR has acquired an increasing “constitutional
dimension,” thus dispelling the fiction of it being merely a sort of superappellate court that scrutinizes individual decisions rather than laws of the
Member States).
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they decide fewer cases and give more reasons and reasons that
are more explanatory? The answer probably depends on the court
under consideration. For instance, should the U.S. Supreme
Court augment its shrinking docket at the expense of its
elaborate opinions?468 A number of legal scholars seem to think
that if the Court took more cases, and took the “right” cases, it
could provide much needed guidance in a broader range of areas
of the law.469 Conversely, should the ECtHR expand its discretion
to hear cases470 and decide fewer cases so that it has more
resources to dedicate to quality reason-giving for the important
cases it chooses to decide? Current plans for reforming the
ECtHR seem to be heading in this direction.
VI. Conclusion
To conclude, it is clear that judicial reason-giving implicates
a wide variety of objectives. In practice, judges may be required to
balance democratic justifications for reason-giving against
institutional, cognitive, and efficiency justifications not to give
reasons. The apparent comparative law story is that civil lawyers
tend to think about reason-giving in absolutist terms, while
common lawyers favor a balancing approach. The former focus on
the judicial restraint potential of reason-giving, while the latter
see reason-giving as a judicial prerogative best left to the courts’
discretion. This Article is part of a larger project that aims to
bridge the gap between these two ways of thinking about reason468. See Black & Spriggs II, supra note 69, at 630 (analyzing data showing
that the average length of the majority opinion of the Court has increased in
recent years).
469. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, Judicial
Independence in Excess: Reviving the Judicial Duty of the Supreme Court, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 587, 622–23 (2009) (arguing that the Court is taking too many
cases involving major questions of constitutional law and too few cases resolving
circuit splits).
470. The ECtHR seems to be moving forward in that direction, as evidenced
by the creation of a “Filtering Section” in January 2011. The Section is presently
focused on filtering out inadmissible cases but is expected to assume broader
functions in the years to come. See FILTERING SECTION S PEEDS UP PROCESSING
OF C ASES F ROM HIGHEST C ASE -C OUNT C OUNTRIES , E UR . C T . OF HUM . R TS .,
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Filtering_Section_ENG.pdf (discussing
the function of the Filtering Section).
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giving and to study decision making in different legal cultures.
The Article’s principal contribution lies in bringing attention to
the fact that judges constantly make trade-offs between reasons
for reasons and reasons against reasons. In balancing these
equities, the civil law and the common law tradition have
developed methodologies that turn out to be more analogous than
usually assumed.

